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authority over almost all federal lands in Utah.1 At the same
time, the governor signed a measure to allocate $3 million from
the state’s school trust fund to support litigation over the new
authority,2 which seems clearly unconstitutional under the
U.S. Constitution’s Property and Supremacy Clauses.3 Some of
the bill’s proponents urged the state to exercise its new eminent domain power over the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, which was established by President Clinton
in defiance of Utah’s elected representatives and is still a sore
point among many residents.4 At a February 2010 hearing, a
former U.S. Supreme Court law clerk and assistant U.S. attorney, Mike Lee, testified in favor of the discredited legal theory
behind the bill.5 Three months later, Lee shocked the Washington political establishment by defeating three-term incumbent
Bob Bennett for the Republican nomination in Utah’s Senate
race.6 Lee won the seat the following November.7 By early
2011, six additional western state legislatures considered similar laws.8 In March, the Montana legislature joined the “legal
challenge of federal land rights” by passing an eminent domain
bill authorizing the state to acquire nationally owned lands.9
1. H.B. 143, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess., 2010 Utah 1258 (codified at UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010)).
2. H.B. 323, 2010 Legis. Gen. Counsel, Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010) ($1 million
per year for three years), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2010/bills/hbillint/
hb0323.pdf; Scott Streater, Utah Eminent Domain Law More Than a ‘Message
Bill,’
LAND
LETTER,
Apr.
1,
2010,
http://www.eenews.net/public/
Landletter/2010/04/01/1.
3. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4. Utah Enacts States Rights Challenge to Federal Lands, PUB. LAND NEWS,
Apr. 2, 2010, at 5.
5. Phil Taylor, U.S. Not ‘Sovereign’ Over Federal Lands, Utah GOP Senate
Candidate Says, LAND LETTER, July 1, 2010, http://www.eenews.net/
public/Landletter/2010/07/01/1.
6. Jeff Zeleny, Nikki Haley Is Winner in South Carolina Runoff, N.Y. TIMES,
June
23,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/us/politics/
23elect.html?scp=1&sq=Nikki%20Haley%20Is%20Winner%20in%20South%20Car
olina%20Runoff&st=cse.
7. New Faces in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at 5.
8. Kirk Johnson, Rallying for States’ Rights, G.O.P. Legislators Tell Washington
to
Go
Away,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
27,
2011,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/j/kirk_johnson/index.ht
ml?offset=50&s=newest (follow “States’ Rights a Priority for G.O.P.-Led Legislatures” hyperlink).
9. Stephen Dockery, Montana House Backs Bill Giving Montana Authority
Over Federal Land, RAVALLI REPUBLIC, Mar. 31, 2011, http://ravallirepublic.com/
news/state-and-regional/article_59555386-1da0-533e-aa56-d96dfd7217e2.html
(quoting bill supporter Montana Rep. Jonathan McNiven). On April 8, 2011, the
legislature transmitted the bill to the governor, who has not yet acted on the statute, but he has indicated that he would veto anti-federal bills. Detailed Bill In-
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Why would Utah throw millions of dollars down the drain
of futile litigation?10 Indeed, why even promote end-run tactics
around federal authority instead of employing existing statutory avenues to influence public land management? The answer,
of course, is politics. Utah is investing in fuel to stoke the fires
of local frustration with federal control over public natural resources. The political movement feeding on this frustration,
compounded by judicial setbacks, goes by many names today.
But the original label is the “Sagebrush Rebellion.”11
The Sagebrush Rebellion was born of similarly hopeless litigation which increased traditional commodity users’ anger
about their perceived loss of control over federal land management. The story of Kleppe v. New Mexico12 illustrates how litigation itself, even when it yields no judicial relief, can serve as
a powerful organizing tool for political movements.13 Social science scholarship richly documents this phenomenon in the context of the civil rights and economic justice movements.14 But it
has yet to illuminate an enduring counterweight to federal control over public lands: the Sagebrush Rebellion. As with other
political and social movements, the anti-federal sentiment in
Utah and Montana (like New Mexico and Nevada before them)
can be sustained by “successful failures.”15

formation:
SB
254,
MONT.
LEGISLATURE,
http://laws.leg.mt.gov/law
s11/law0203w$.startup (find “Bill Type and Number” SB 254) (last visited Oct. 2,
2011); Johnson, supra note 8. (“The governor, who is from a family of ranchers,
said he had just registered a cattle brand that spelled out the word ‘veto.’ ”).
10. Utah is just now gearing up for litigation, having expended funds appropriated by the 2010 law to prepare a notice of intent to file suit. The suit claims
rights-of-way in the Garfield County portion of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument. E-mail from John Hurst, Senior Policy Advisor, Utah Pub.
Lands Policy Coordination Office, to Jeremiah Williamson (June 9, 2011, 4:48 PM)
(on file with author).
11. See generally John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law,
Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980).
12. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
13. See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 278–80 (1994) (discussing how movementbuilding outcomes can be more important than direct policy results or the creation
of new rights); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS,
PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL CHANGE 8 (Univ. of Mich. 2d ed. 2004) (1974)
(same).
14. See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS,
AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); EVE S. WEINBAUM,
TO MOVE A MOUNTAIN: FIGHTING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IN APPALACHIA (2004).
We relate this literature to the Sagebrush Rebellion. See infra Part IV.
15. WEINBAUM, supra note 14, at 267.
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This Article aims to understand a landmark Supreme
Court decision as a crucial early spark of the rebellion by exploring the case’s context and political significance. Such an
approach explains why a state would embark on an expensive
and risky legal strategy. It also counters the conventional narrative that Kleppe stands for expansive federal power under
the Constitution’s Property Clause.16 While that accurately
characterizes the legal holding, it fails to account for the case’s
role in establishing a strong and ongoing movement to offset
federal control over public natural resources. Even as Congress
increasingly offers “cooperative federalism” for states to influence public land management,17 the Kleppe litigation’s legacy
of “un-cooperative federalism” remains a common and effective
response.18
In recent years, several popular essay collections have
deepened our understanding of fields such as environmental,
administrative, and constitutional law by telling the “stories” of
court decisions.19 Storytelling reveals the complex motivations
and background facts of parties and disputes.20 It counteracts
the tendency of theory to gloss over particulars that reveal im-

16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3., cl. 2.
17. Cooperative federalism is an arrangement of power under which a national government induces coordination from subordinate jurisdictions. Robert L.
Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 179, 200 (2005); see also infra notes 268–71, 318–24 and accompanying text
(discussing cooperative federalism).
18. We employ the term “un-cooperative federalism” to contrast the legacy of
Kleppe with the common statutory approaches to cooperative federalism. See, e.g.,
Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights Is Rallying Cry for Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/003/17/us/17states.html (discussing the continued
popularity of “un-cooperative federalism”); see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen &
Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (developing a framework for understanding different kinds of un-cooperative federalism);
infra notes 322–26 and accompanying text. Along the continuum from polite conversation toward restrained disagreement, to “fighting words,” our example of uncooperative federalism is on the far end of, and possibly beyond, civil disobedience.
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra, at 1271; see also infra notes 324–28 and accompanying text.
19. See generally ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006);
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES (Michael C. Dorf ed., Found. Press 2009) (2004);
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).
20. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 1–6, 14–21
(Univ. of Cal. Press 2002) (1976) (stories unmask the participants in legal disputes and illuminate underlying humanity). See generally JAMES BOYD WHITE,
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (Univ. of Chi. Press 1985) (1973) (seminal work on the
role of narrative in understanding the meaning of law).
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portant aspects of legal developments.21 There is no collection
of natural resource or federal public land stories, and they are
almost entirely absent from the Environmental Law Stories
anthology.22 If there were such a collection, surely Kleppe
would warrant treatment as a critical buttress of modern natural resources law.23 All of the major natural resources casebooks feature Kleppe v. New Mexico as a principal case.24 But
the story of Kleppe teaches more about public land lawmaking

21. Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW’S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 2, 6 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds.,
1996). Perhaps more relevant to the Kleppe story is its “healthy disruption and
challenge to [legal doctrine, economic analysis, or philosophic theory].” Martha
Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW,
supra, at 24, 36. But see JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, LAW’S ENVIRONMENT: HOW THE
LAW SHAPES THE PLACES WE LIVE 251 (2010) (“[S]torytelling, like the Sun in the
sky, obscures as much as it reveals.”) (quoting Timothy Ferris).
22. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES, supra note 19. However, Oliver Houck has told the stories of several natural resources cases, including foreign ones. See OLIVER A. HOUCK, TAKING BACK EDEN: EIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL
CASES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2010); Oliver Houck, The Water, the Trees,
and the Land: Three Nearly Forgotten Cases that Changed the American Landscape, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2279, 2291–99 (1996) (recounting the United States’ land
law story of West Virginia Division of the Izzak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d
945 (4th Cir. 1975)); id. at 2300–08 (recounting the story of Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C.
Cir. 1976)); Oliver Houck, Unfinished Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 867, 909–21
(2002) (recounting the United States’ land law story of Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972)).
23. The Kleppe decision immediately attracted scholarship in law journals
and continues to be a foundational reference point for articles and student notes
on natural resources and public land law. See, e.g., Peter A. Appel, The Power of
Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of
Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the
“Classic” Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617, 617–20 (1985); Dale D.
Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 495
(1986) (arguing against those who adhere to Property Clause theories inconsistent
with the holding of Kleppe); Blake Shepard, The Scope of Congress’ Constitutional
Power Under the Property Clause: Regulating Non-Federal Property to Further the
Purposes of National Parks and Wilderness Areas, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
479, 489–90, 498–514 (1984); Margaret Elizabeth Plumb, Note, Expansion of National Power Under the Property Clause: Federal Regulation of Wildlife, 12 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 181 (1977); Louis Touton, Note, The Property Power, Federalism,
and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 823–25, 834–39 (1980);
Linda Williams, Note, Constitutionality of the Free Roaming Wild Horses and
Burros Act: The Ecosystem and the Property Clause in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 7
ENVTL. L. 137 (1976).
24. See GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES
LAW 163 (6th ed. 2007); CHRISTINE A. KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A
PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 90 (2d ed. 2009); JAN G. LAITOS ET
AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 1202 (2006); JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 148 (2d ed. 2009).
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than the Court’s expounding on the Constitution’s Property
Clause.
Kleppe dramatizes the changing relationship between livestock ranchers and the public rangelands. It describes how assertion of federal power advancing national conservation objectives collided with traditional, local economic interests on public lands. The legislation challenged in Kleppe—the Wild FreeRoaming Horses and Burros Act (WFRHBA)25—diminished the
influence of states and ranchers over federal rangelands. The
Kleppe decision resoundingly approved federal authority to
reprioritize uses of the public resources, including wildlife, and
spurred a lasting backlash in the western United States (the
West). Further legislation passed in the wake of Kleppe intensified this political unrest into the full-blown Sagebrush Rebellion. Though the Kleppe litigation failed to undermine Congress’s public land reform agenda, the Sagebrush Rebellion
lived to fight another day.
In 1970, the Public Land Law Review Commission outlined
a reform agenda for Congress.26 The 1971 Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act27 was not a part of that agenda, but it
turned out to be the opening salvo in a decade-long battle over
public land lawmaking. The 1971 law signaled the diminution
of ranchers’ power over public rangelands in the legislative
realm, and the litigation that followed further threatened the
influence of the graziers. However, adjudicated rights do not
necessarily translate into social facts.28 This Article argues
that a strictly legal evaluation of the Kleppe litigation fails to
measure its true significance as a galvanizing event for the
Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1970s and the subsequent “wise
use” wars over public lands.29 The Article proceeds in four
parts.

25. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat.
649 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2006)).
26. PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND
(1970).
27. Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat. 649.
28. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 13, at 3–9.
29. See ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE: ECOSYSTEMS,
DEMOCRACY, AND AMERICA’S PUBLIC LANDS (2003) (discussing “wise use” wars
that succeeded the Sagebrush Rebellion); WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (Charles Davis ed., 2d ed. 2001); Florance Williams,
Sagebrush Rebellion II, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 24, 1992, at 1. Even today, a
Utah group opposing federal management of roads on public lands calls itself the
Sagebrush Coalition. Jen Jackson, The Revolution Will Be Motorized, HIGH
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Part I of this Article sets the stage for the story of Kleppe
by reviewing the history of ranching conflict on public lands,
and the legislation addressing allocation of scarce rangeland
resources. While rangeland reform of the 1930s aimed at soil
conservation imposed new regulations on public land graziers,
that purpose served the long-term interest of ranchers. In contrast, the 1971 Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act displaced ranching as the de facto priority use of public rangelands and helped trigger the Sagebrush Rebellion.
Part II focuses on the lawsuit challenging the 1971 statute
and describes the stakeholders, arguments, and ultimate resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court. Delivered by a unanimous
Court, Kleppe v. New Mexico now stands as the leading case interpreting the Constitution’s Property Clause as a very broad
grant of power to Congress. Though New Mexico failed to persuade even a single Justice, its litigation promoted greater political momentum in the West to resist public natural resources
law reform.
Part III shows how that resistance shaped the Sagebrush
Rebellion. Shortly after the Kleppe decision, Congress enacted
a comprehensive charter for rangeland management that further inflamed ranchers. They sought to undermine the new
statute and other legislation reforming public land administration. While states participated in the cooperative federalism
procedures provided by the legislation, they also engaged in
“un-cooperative federalism” through a series of direct challenges to national resource management authority. Part III also
examines the federal legislation and an ill-fated attempt by
Nevada to control public rangelands.
Part IV explores the ways in which social science scholarship helps explain how New Mexico, and subsequently other
western states, made lemonade out of courthouse losses. The
political consequences of the “un-cooperative” challenges to federal power mostly aided ranchers and other interest groups associated with western state governments. Their embattled solidarity helped elect sympathetic officials (such as Senator Mike
Lee) and profoundly influenced implementation of the public
land statutes.

COUNTRY NEWS, June 14, 2011, http://www.hcn.org/hcn/wotr/the-revolution-willbe-motorized.
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PUBLIC RANGELAND LAW

The federal government today manages nearly 330 million
acres of public rangelands mostly scattered across sixteen
western states.30 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
oversees roughly 160 million acres of these lands, divided into
more than 21,000 allotments authorized for grazing under
nearly 18,000 permits.31 The Forest Service manages grazing
on an additional 96 million acres of public land.32 The size of
this part of the public estate has changed little since the 1930s.
Before then, disposal dominated federal public land policy.33
The United States divested itself of considerable acreage
through statehood and homestead acts, railroad grants, and
other devices.34 Disposal flowed from the premise that “the
public domain ought to be thrown open to private development,
free of charge and unfettered by government regulation.”35
However, the federal government retained a substantial
amount of dry, rocky land that was not suitable for agriculture
and valuable only as pasturage.36 These relatively infertile
western lands constitute the majority of the public rangelands.37
A. Rangeland Conflict and the Taylor Grazing Act
Competition for scarce resources—forage and water—
prompted disputes on the public rangelands.38 In the early
years of grazing on public rangelands, beginning in the 1880s,
“adjudication of range rights . . . was mostly by sword and pis-

30. About Rangelands, U. S. FOREST SERVICE, http://www.fs.fed.us/
rangelands/whoweare/index.shtml (last visited May 4, 2011).
31. Fact Sheet on the BLM’s Management of Livestock Grazing, BUREAU OF
LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/grazing.html (last updated Sept.
27, 2011).
32. About Rangelands, supra note 30.
33. Disposal involves the transfer of property out of federal ownership.
MARION CLAWSON & BURNELL HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS: THEIR USE AND
MANAGEMENT 5–7, 17, 22–27 (1957).
34. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 24, at 89–117.
35. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Law of the American West: A Critical Bibliography of the Nonlegal Sources, 85 MICH. L. REV. 955, 1003 (1987).
36. Phillip O. Foss, The Determination of Grazing Fees on Federally-Owned
Range Lands, 41 J. FARM ECON. 535, 535 (1959).
37. DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVISITED 13 (1999).
38. Foss, supra note 36.
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tol.”39 Among the conflicts later known as the “range wars”
were the Johnson County and Upper Green River wars in Wyoming, the Tonto Basin War in Arizona, and a number of other
conflicts in places like the Blue Mountains of Oregon.40 These
fights over resources often pitted graziers against each other
(large vs. small operations, or cattle vs. sheep ranchers) or
against homesteaders.41 In 1885, Congress reacted to the conflicts by passing the Unlawful Enclosures Act,42 which limited
one tool that ranchers had used to exclude others: fences. This
was but the first of many federal restrictions to come.
Once the range wars quieted, Congress mostly ignored the
rangelands for the next fifty years. Founding Forest Service
Chief, Gifford Pinchot, exercised his broad (but vague) legislative authority to impose permit requirements on graziers using
national forest rangelands.43 The backlash from ranchers was
fierce.44 But passive neglect characterized federal management
over most public rangelands, especially outside of the national
forests. Thus, the classic “tragedy of the commons” unfolded,
resulting in overgrazing of public lands.45
The slow recognition of range degradation resulting from
government mismanagement laid the groundwork for reform.46
By the early 1900s, overgrazing already had noticeably reduced
the capacity of the public range to support livestock.47 Still, it
took the great dust storms of the mid-1930s to prompt congressional enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 and its
1936 amendments.48 The Act guided management of federally
owned rangelands, focusing primarily on preventing degrada39. M.W. Talbot & F.P. Cronemiller, Some of the Beginnings of Range Management, 14 J. RANGE MGMT. 95, 95–96 (1961).
40. Id.
41. DONAHUE, supra note 37, at 20–21.
42. 43 U.S.C. § 1061 (2006); see also Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S.
668, 684 (1979).
43. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (upholding grazing
permits and fees notwithstanding that there is no mention of them in the legislation authorizing national forest management).
44. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land, supra note 22, at 2302–03.
45. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968)
(using overgrazing as illustration of “tragedy of the commons” where no user of
common resources can exclude others).
46. Talbot & Cronemiller, supra note 39, at 97.
47. Id.
48. Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 stat. 1269 (1934) (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. § 315 (2006)); see also E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: DISPOSAL AND RESERVATION POLICIES 1900–50, at 214–24 (1951) (describing history of the Act).
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tion and thus stabilizing the livestock industry. It authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to establish grazing districts and
to manage them through permits.49 The Act expressed the
then-dominant view that livestock grazing was “the highest use
of the public lands pending its final disposal.”50 The disposal
language meant that “the federal government considered public
lands as temporary holdings to be claimed, privatized, and
homesteaded as the nation matured.”51 Paradoxically, however,
the Taylor Grazing Act, by authorizing active management of
unreserved federal lands, effectively closed the window on “unrestricted entry” of the public lands.52
In practice, the Taylor Grazing Act operated for the benefit
of ranchers.53 The Interior Department delegated most important decisions to local grazing districts and boards. Grazing
advisory boards composed exclusively of ranchers worked with
“stockmen” district administrators to manage rangelands and
determine proper grazing intensities.54 “To Western stockmen,
these may have been public lands, but they were their public
lands.”55 Despite the reforms of the 1970s, which implemented
environmental regulations and comprehensive federal resource
planning regimes, the Taylor Grazing Act remains the basic legal framework for allocating range resources.56
B. The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
Limited water and forage for livestock, which often
brought ranchers into conflict with each other, also pitted the
49. See 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2006).
50. Id. Congress twice amended the Act to open up more public lands to livestock grazing. In 1936, Congress increased the acreage that could be included in
grazing districts from eighty million acres to 142 million acres. Act of June 26,
1936, Pub. L. No. 827, ch. 842, 49 Stat. 1976. Eighteen years later, Congress removed the acreage limitation altogether. Act of May 28, 1954, Pub. L. No. 375, ch.
243, 68 Stat. 151.
51. Nancie G. Marzulla, Property Rights Movement: How It Began and Where
It Is Headed, in A WOLF IN THE GARDEN 39 (Philip D. Brick & R. McGreggor Cawley eds., 1996) (discussing pre-1964 Interior Department policy).
52. PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 26, at 43.
53. See Richard H. Braun, Emerging Limits on Federal Land Management
Discretion: Livestock, Riparian Ecosystems and Clean Water Law, 17 ENVTL. L.
43, 52–58 (1986); George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindberg-Johnson, The
Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13
ENVTL. L. 1, 100 (1982).
54. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land, supra note 22, at 2303.
55. Id. at 2301.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 315–23.
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primary users of the public range against wild burros and
horses. Horses and burros compete directly with livestock for
water and forage.57 Compounding this conflict, horses and burros lack limits on population growth because they have no natural predators on the rangelands.58 The wild horses and burros
that inhabit North America are not native species, but are the
descendants of strays and abandoned animals.59 The oldest lineage traces its roots to the Spanish conquistadors60 but today it
accounts for only a small fraction of the horses and burros inhabiting the public lands.61 The majority of the horses in fact
owe their existence to the resolute ability of animals that
strayed or were abandoned, often when economic circumstances changed, to survive in a harsh land.62
The American market demands little horsemeat, and wild
horses interfered with the more profitable use of public rangelands, namely livestock grazing. Therefore, although many
ranchers tolerated wild horses for both aesthetic and commercial reasons, others viewed the horses as feral pests.63 As a result, federal agents frequently removed wild horses and burros
from the public range.64 Federal agents, however, were not the
only people taking wild burros and horses from the public
lands. In fact, virtually every western state legislature provided state agencies with the authority to remove abandoned,
stray, or unbranded burros and horses.65 Such laws provided a

57. Kenneth P. Pitt, The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act: A Western Melodrama, 15 ENVTL. L. 503, 511 (1985) (noting “definite temporal and spatial overlap between wild horses and other species”).
58. Id. at 505.
59. Id. at 505–06.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. RICHARD SYMANSKI, WILD HORSES AND SACRED COWS 131 (1985). Besides
horsemeat, the other major commercial use of wild horses was slaughter for the
production of glue. See, e.g., Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 176 (1956).
64. See, e.g., Hatahley, 351 U.S at 176 (involving federal officers removing
free-roaming horses pursuant to Utah’s abandoned horse statute). Though some
“removed” animals would be shot on site, others would be sold for horsemeat or
glue feedstock. Id.
65. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 3-1336 (1952); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §
16521 (West 1933); COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-44-101 (1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 252309 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-14-1 (1966); NEV. REV. STAT. § 569.120 (1961);
OR. REV. STAT. § 607.007 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-25-1 (West 1953); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 11-24-101 (1913); see also Protection of Wild Horses on Public Lands:
Hearing on H.R. 795 and H.R. 5375 Before the H. Subcomm. on Pub. Lands of the
H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong. 147–50 (1971) [hereinafter
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useful tool for many ranchers who valued the presence of the
horses and burros, but at the same time recognized that a lack
of natural predators necessitated population culling.66
When the demand for pet food made horse hunting a profitable venture, the broad language of state estray laws facilitated a new business.67 Private profiteers pursued the horses,
often utilizing appalling tactics. One author summarized the
process as follows:
Low-flying airplanes drove the wild horses towards mounted cowboys who fired shotguns at the horses to make them
run faster. Captured horses were tied to large truck tires to
exhaust them and make them easier to handle. Exhausted,
they would be packed into trucks so tight that only their
weight against each other held them up. Foals, weighing
less, often were abandoned to die. Seeking maximum profits, often six and a half cents a pound, the hunters seldom
fed or watered the horses and many died en route to the
slaughterhouse.68

Such atrocities gained national media attention during the
1950s, resulting in the passage of the Wild Horse Annie Act,69
which prohibited both the poisoning of watering holes and the
use of motorized vehicles to hunt horses and burros.70
However, the Wild Horse Annie Act failed to protect the
wild horses and burros because hunters simply resorted to nonmotorized means of capture.71 Moreover, state livestock boards
continued to remove animals interfering with commercial graz-

House Hearings] (statement of Dean Prosser, President, International Livestock
Brand Conference).
66. SYMANSKI, supra note 63, at 65; see also Pitt, supra note 57, at 517 n.75
(noting that before the Act, ranchers often managed horse populations in cooperation with horse advocacy groups).
67. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DEP’T OF INTERIOR, OUR PUBLIC LANDS 3 (1980)
[hereinafter OUR PUBLIC LANDS].
68. Pitt, supra note 57, at 506.
69. Pub. L. No. 86-234, 73 Stat. 470 (1959) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 47 (2006)). The Act is named after Velma B. Johnston, also known as Wild Horse
Annie, who led the Wild Horse Organized Assistance and dedicated her life to protecting free-roaming horses. See Velma B. Johnston, The Fight to Save a Memory,
50 TEX. L. REV. 1055 (1972), for Ms. Johnston’s account of her experiences with
common wild-horse-gathering practices and her efforts to protect the wild horse.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 47 (2006). The Act’s actual prohibition is for “pollution” of watering holes for the purpose of trapping, killing, wounding, or maiming. Id.
71. Pitt, supra note 57, at 506–07; see also Johnston, supra note 69, at 1057–
59 (suggesting that the Wild Horse Annie Act was only half-heartedly enforced in
the West, in part due to the influence of livestock interests).
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ing.72 In response, Congress reformed public rangelands management with the WFRHBA.73 This Act gave sweeping protections to all unclaimed and unbranded horses and burros on
public lands, prohibiting their capture, branding, harassment,
and killing.74 It “essentially reversed BLM’s grassland management policy,”75 declaring wild burros and horses to be “an
integral part of the natural system of the public lands.”76 However, the horses and burros do considerable damage to the
rangeland ecosystems:
By passage of [the WFRHBA] the U.S. Congress declared
that it felt it had the power to override the results of
500,000 years of separate evolution of New World and Old
World equid lineages, and furthermore invalidated the extinction of North American equids near the end of the Pleistocene. Congress may have given legal status to these noxious herbivores, but Congress sees the natural world
through a different visual filter than serious ecologists.77

The WFRHBA directed the BLM to shift its attention from
managing grazing for the long-term benefit of ranching to “protection of specific rangeland resources,” including horses and
burros.78
This revolution in rangeland management hurt livestock
ranchers who grazed cattle and sheep on public lands. Federal
protection of wild horses and burros resulted in more competition with livestock for forage and water.79 The Act indirectly
required ranchers to subsidize horse and burro access to water
with extra fuel to run well pumps and repair horse and burrocaused damage, thus increasing the operating costs of an already marginally profitable industry.80 Ranchers correctly
72. SYMANSKI, supra note 63, at 129.
73. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat.
649 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2006)).
74. Id.
75. Pitt, supra note 57, at 515.
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
77. Bruce E. Coblentz, Letter to the Editor, 13 NAT. AREAS J. 3, 3 (1993).
78. Today, the WFRHBA joins a host of other statutes that direct BLM to embrace such rangeland resources as riparian areas, threatened and endangered
species, sensitive plant species, and cultural or historical objects. Fact Sheet on
the BLM’s Management of Livestock Grazing, supra note 31. Focusing on these
objectives may impair ranching interests.
79. See SYMANSKI, supra note 63, at 137–39.
80. Id. at 137–38. The operator of one ranch estimated that the damage from
wild horses resulted in a $50,000 per year increase in operating costs. Id. at 137.
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sensed that the 1971 law signaled a loss of control over public
rangelands.
Even though statutory protections for horses and burros
imposed costs on ranching, the legislative history displays indifference toward these economic harms.81 Support for the legislation and the plight of the wild horse dominated the congressional hearings, with representatives taking considerable time
to pat themselves on the back for engaging in so worthy a
cause.82 Congressman after congressman made the case
against the “savage destruction”83 of the “living symbols of the
historic significance and pioneer spirit of the West,”84 each time
generating responses of congratulation and thanks from other
representatives.85 When the first witness to testify introduced
a letter from a nine-year-old Michigan girl stating that “[e]very
time the men come to kill the horses for pet food, I think you
kill many children’s hearts,”86 committee members commended
and thanked him for his efforts.87
When ranchers did get their chance to testify, they were on
the defensive. Much time was devoted to refuting accusations
that ranchers were engaging in the wholesale slaughter of
horses.88 Karl Weikel, who testified on behalf of the American
National Cattlemen’s Association and the American National
Wool Growers Association, began by explaining that “the issue
has been clouded by controversy, accusations, counteraccusations and recriminations based mostly upon misunderstanding
of, and impatience with, past mistakes, abuses, misuses and
poor management decisions resulting from mistaken policy and

81. See Pitt, supra note 57, at 513. See generally House Hearings, supra note
65; Protection of Wild Horses and Burros on Public Lands: Hearing on S. 862, S.
1116, S. 1090, and S. 1119 Before the S. Subcomm. on Pub. Lands of the S. Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong. 23–24 (1971) (statements of Sen.
Church acknowledging the “many heartfelt letters the committee has received
from schoolchildren throughout the Nation urging the preservation of wild horses
and burros”).
82. House Hearings, supra note 65, at 10–16 (statements of Reps. Johnson,
Foley, Roncalio, Williams, Steiger, and Baring).
83. Id. at 14 (statement of Rep. Williams).
84. Id. at 17 (statement of Rep. Gude).
85. See, e.g., id. at 16 (statements of Reps. Dellenback, Baring, and Williams).
86. Id. at 19 (statement of Gregory Gude, son of Rep. Gude); see also id. at
137 (testimony of Hope Ryden), for another child’s letter expressing support for
the plight of the wild horse.
87. Id. at 19–20 (statements of Reps. Steiger, Saylor, and Dellenback).
88. See, e.g., id. at 117–18 (statement of Karl Weikel, American National Cattlemen’s Association).
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too little factual information.”89 He then expressly refuted the
claim that “western livestock interests sought to extinguish
wild horses and burros”90 and went on to state a more nuanced
position, with a concern for management that balanced protection for equids with the legitimate interests of ranchers. But
his explanations fell flat, a fact made evident at the conclusion
of Mr. Weikel’s remarks when Representative Johnson asked
whether ranching interests actually “believe in protecting the
wild horse.”91
Making matters worse, grazing interests appeared disorganized and disjointed on approaches to the proposed legislation. The Wyoming Wool Growers Association argued in support of establishing horse refuges,92 while the National
Cattlemen’s Association argued adamantly against refuges.93
The testimony of one witness, who described the viciousness of
the “wild jackass,” suggested that ranching interests were at a
loss for dealing with the media frenzy that surrounded the
push for horse protection.94
The public had already made up its mind, and legislators
had clearly taken note. In one observer’s description, the legislators saw the rancher as “a profiteer, intent on using the public domain to satisfy his own greed, secretly shooting and
maiming horses, fencing horses away from water, and generally being an all around bad guy.”95 As if to marginalize rancher
concerns, the House Subcommittee on Public Lands scheduled
the testimony of a fourth grader to follow the joint testimony of
the National Cattlemen’s Association and the National Wool
Growers Association.96 Unable to find relief in the legislative
process, the primary users of the public rangelands turned to
other avenues which are explored in the subsequent parts of
this Article.
The ranchers had few friends in Congress who were willing
to stand up to the sentiment of the WFRHBA supporters. This
89. Id. at 117.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 128 (question of Rep. Johnson).
92. Id. at 131–33 (statement of Robert P. Bledsoe, Executive Secretary, Wyoming Wool Growers Association).
93. Id. at 123 (testimony of Karl Weikel).
94. Id. at 117, 123. Mr. Weikel’s objections were not limited to the vicious nature of the wild burro, as he went on to explain that “[i]t will be most difficult in
the Southwest to convince some of our Indian and Spanish people that they can’t
turn their horses out when they want to.” Id. at 121.
95. Pitt, supra note 57, at 513.
96. House Hearings, supra note 65, at 142–43.
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is particularly striking given the prominent role that otherwise
rancher-friendly western members of Congress played in drafting the statute. The Senate version of the WFRHBA passed
without dissent on June 29, 1971.97 A House bill with only minor differences unanimously passed on October 4, 1971.98 Congress reconciled and enacted the law later that year, and President Nixon signed the WFRHBA on December 15, 1971.99
The new law could not change the fact that wild horses and
burros “alter the ecosystems by consuming native plants, competing with native mammals such as the Desert Bighorn
Sheep, fouling springs, and contributing to erosion by wearing
trails on the steep desert hillsides.”100 Nevertheless, the
WFRHBA declares that wild equids are “an integral part of the
natural system of the public lands.”101 The WFRHBA charges
the Secretary of the Interior with protecting wild horses and
burros, but at the same time commands the Secretary to manage wild equids “in a manner that is designed to achieve and
maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public
lands.”102 The idea that protecting an invasive species, which
causes harm to delicate desert ecosystems, could be done in
such a way as to obtain “thriving natural ecological balance” is
absurd.103 This general tone of protectionism, rather than balanced management,104 likely is the reason the WFRHBA received virtually no support from environmental groups.105

97. 117 CONG. REC. 22,671 (1971).
98. Id. at 34,782.
99. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat.
649, 651 (1971); see also H.R. REP. NO. 92-681 (1971) (Conf. Rep.); ENVTL. POLICY
DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 74-795, REPORT ON PUBLIC LAND POLICY:
ACTIVITIES IN THE 92D CONGRESS 1–2 (1972).
100. Michael L. Wolfe, The Wild Horse and Burro Issue, 1982, 7 ENVTL. REV.
179, 183 (1983); see also Richard H. Gilluly, The Mustang Controversy, 99 SCI.
NEWS 219, 220 (1971) (noting that horses compete with mule deer for food and
that restoring desert big horn sheep populations would require “drastic reductions” in horse populations).
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
102. Id. § 1333 (emphasis added).
103. See Wolfe, supra note 100, at 186 (stating that “there is no logic in assigning the maintenance of populations of these non-native and feral animals any
higher ethical or socio-political priority than that accorded to indigenous wildlife
species”).
104. See Wolfe, supra note 100, at 183.
105. The Sierra Club did submit one page of written testimony in support of
horse protections. House Hearings, supra note 65, at 198–99. Even in light of the
Act’s shortcomings, environmental groups were wise not to oppose the Act in the
Kleppe litigation because the Court’s broad endorsement of Congress’s Property
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Due in part to these flaws, the BLM has struggled to implement the Act. In 1980, BLM estimated the yearly cost to
administer the Act would reach $40 million.106 Three decades
later, the annual price tag continues to rise.107 The WFRHBA
seeks to promote adoption of excess wild horses as an alternative to slaughter. On average, about half of the WFRHBA’s implementation costs arise from the adoption program, which has
been such a failure that almost as many horses now dwell in
BLM holding pens as live in the wild.108 Conditions in the pens
can be unhealthy for the animals, breeding disease due to overcrowding.109 The federal government estimates that the public
rangelands support over 35,000 wild horses, which is about
10,000 horses in excess of carrying capacity.110 Even with over
30,000 animals in BLM corrals and pastures, the number of
wild horses and burros on the rangeland continues to grow.111
Clause power provided a strong foundation for protecting environmental interests
in federal lands.
106. House Hearings, supra note 65, at 183–84.
107. Fact Sheet on the BLM’s Management of Livestock Grazing, supra note 31.
The fiscal year 2010 operating appropriations for the program were $64 million,
and the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget asks for $76 million. BLM Looking for
Wild Horse Sanctuaries, PUB. LAND NEWS, Apr. 8, 2011, at 14.
108. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-77, BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT: EFFECTIVE LONG-TERM OPTIONS NEEDED TO MANAGE
UNADOPTABLE WILD HORSES 7–8 (2008). Representantive Sam Steiger (R-AZ)
predicted this consequence in 1971. Discussing the adoption program, he stated:
“If we talk about gathering and selling them at auction, we are kidding ourselves
because these animals normally don’t make very good pets unless you want one
for your mother-in-law with whom you don’t have a particularly good relationship.” House Hearings, supra note 65, at 22; see also Phil Taylor, BLM Announces
‘New Direction’ for Horse and Burro Program, LAND LETTER, June 10, 2010 [hereinafter,
Taylor,
New
Direction],
http://plc.cylosoftdemo.com/CMDocs
/PublicLandsCouncil/WILD_HORSES_E&E.pdf (stating that around 70 percent of
the annual budget for wild horses and burros is spent on animals in BLM corrals
and pastures).
109. Nick Neely, Eligible Mustangs, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 12, 2010,
http://www.hcn.org/issues/42.6/eligible-mustangs (describing the BLM adoption
program); see also Phil Taylor, BLM Facilities Reach Capacity as Herds Boom,
LAND LETTER, May 14, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/Landletter/2009/05/14/7/
[hereinafter, Taylor, Herds Boom] (describing animal rights activists’ displeasure
with many aspects of the BLM corral program).
110. BLM looking for Wild Horse Sanctuaries, supra note 107, at 14.
111. See Lyndsey Layton & Juliet Eilperin, Salazar Presents Ambitious Plan to
Manage Wild Horses; Preserves in Midwest and East, Sterilizations Proposed as
Population Grows Beyond Control in West, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2009, at A3; Taylor, Herds Boom, supra note 109; Taylor, New Direction, supra note 108 (stating
that the BLM estimates that herd numbers could grow to 325,000 by year 2021
without countermeasures). The BLM, on at least one occasion, indicated the need
to euthanize animals due to overpopulation and the excessive costs of holding the
animals. Taylor, Herds Boom, supra note 109.
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The result is overgrazing, soil erosion, and the destruction of
mule deer, elk, and antelope habitat.112 Amendments to the
WFRHBA in 1978, part of the Public Rangelands Improvement
Act,113 were intended to rein in administrative costs and to
provide more authority for the BLM to combat overpopulation,
but many of the original problems remain.114 In addition to direct costs, indirect expenses of the Act have come in the form of
extensive litigation. Over forty cases challenging BLM’s implementation of the Act have made it to the federal courts.115
II. THE LITIGATION
Kelley Stephenson was a New Mexico livestock rancher.116
Pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act, Stephenson held grazing
rights to some 8,000 acres of public rangeland.117 Although little information exists regarding his personal history, it is clear
that, like many livestock ranchers, the public rangelands
played an important role in supporting his operation. Stephenson’s grazing allotment included an invaluable desert water
source known as the Taylor Well.118 In the arid western cli-

112. See, e.g., Taylor, Herds Boom, supra note 109.
113. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1908 (2006). In its 1978 statement of national policy,
Congress reaffirmed the policy of protection, but also addressed the need to “facilitat[e] the removal and disposal of excess wild free-roaming horses and burros
which pose a threat to themselves and their habitat and to other rangeland values.” Id. § 1901(b)(4).
114. Recent proposals by the Obama Administration to address ongoing problems with the administration of the WFRHBA include: providing additional funding, relocating herds from the West to midwestern or eastern lands, and increasing the use of infertility drugs and promoting partnerships with private and
nongovernmental entities. See, e.g., Layton & Eilperin, supra note 111; April
Reese, Eastward Ho! BLM Proposes New Sanctuaries in More Populated States,
LAND LETTER, Oct. 15, 2009; DoI Proposes New Preserves as Part of Wild Horse
Plan, PUB. LAND NEWS, Oct. 16, 2009, at 1; Obama Administration Fashions Multi-Part Wild Horse Solution, PUB. LAND NEWS, Oct. 13, 2009.
115. Kristen H. Glover, Managing Wild Horses on Public Lands: Congressional
Action and Agency Response, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1108, 1109 (2001); see, e.g., Am.
Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Watt, 694 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Dahl v. Clark, 600 F.
Supp. 585 (D. Nev. 1984); Animal Prot. Inst. v. Hodel, 671 F. Supp. 695 (D. Nev.
1987); see also Richard Symanski, Dances with Horses: Lessons from the Environmental Fringe, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 708, 708, 712 (1996) (describing
certain aspects of one Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros case litigated by the
Rutgers Law School Animal Rights Law Clinic as “spurious” and “perversely
counterproductive”).
116. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 533 (1976).
117. Id.
118. Id. Coincidentally, it was the Taylor Grazing Act under which Stephenson
acquired his permit to use the allotment. Id.
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mate, wells are one of the most important assets of a livestock
operation. Wells are not naturally occurring bodies of water,
but rather holes dug deep into the ground, from which ground
water is pumped into a large trough that often resembles a
plastic children’s swimming pool. Gas or diesel generators usually run the pumps, which ranchers visit and refuel on a regular basis. Because of the importance of wells to a livestock operation, as well as the time and labor required to develop and
maintain them, ranchers guard wells zealously.
On the first day of February 1974, Stephenson discovered
several unbranded and unclaimed burros wandering on his private land and on the rangelands his cattle were authorized to
graze.119 Stephenson requested that the BLM remove the burros because they were eating the feed he put out for his livestock and harassing his animals.120 Stephenson may also have
been concerned that the burros were competing with his livestock for access to water at the Taylor Well.121 Regardless,
BLM made it clear that no removal would occur.122 So, Stephenson turned to state law for relief. He found it in the New
Mexico Estray Law, which provided the New Mexico Livestock
Board with the authority to round up and auction:
[a]ny bovine animal, horse, mule or ass, found running at
large upon public or private lands, either fenced or unfenced, in the state of New Mexico, whose owner is unknown
in the section where found, or which shall be fifty [50] miles
or more from the limits of its usual range or pasture, or that
is branded with a brand which is not on record in the office
of the cattle sanitary board of New Mexico . . . .123

The New Mexico Livestock Board is part of the oldest law
enforcement agency in the state.124 It originally consisted of
two separate agencies—the Cattle Sanitary Board, founded in
1887, and the Sheep Sanitary Board, founded in 1889.125 The
119. New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237, 1237 (D.N.M. 1975).
120. Id. at 1238.
121. Oral Argument at 8:20, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No.
74-1488), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1488
(last visited July 27, 2011). The government stated at oral argument that Stephenson learned of the burros while visiting the local BLM office, which had photos of the burros standing around the well. Id. at 8:00–9:08.
122. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 533 (1976).
123. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-14-1 (1966).
124. NEW MEXICO LIVESTOCK BOARD, http://www.nmlbonline.com (last visited
June 25, 2011).
125. Id.
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two agencies merged in 1967 to form the New Mexico Livestock
Board.126 After passage of and pursuant to the WFRHBA, the
board entered into a cooperative agreement with the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture to implement the Act. Apparently displeased with the results, the board terminated the
agreement in November 1973.127
On February 18, 1974, seventeen days after Stephenson’s
complaint to the BLM, the board rounded up and removed
nineteen unbranded and unclaimed burros pursuant to the
New Mexico Estray Law.128 Each burro was seized from federal
land; none was taken from private land.129 That same day, in
accordance with usual practice, the Board sold the burros at
public auction.130 After the sale, the BLM asserted jurisdiction
under the WFRHBA and “demanded that the [b]oard recover
the animals and return them to the public lands.”131 The fight
was on.
A. New Mexico v. Morton
In response to the BLM’s demand for the return of the
seized burros, the State of New Mexico, the New Mexico Livestock Board and its director, as well as the purchaser of three
of the auctioned burros, filed suit in the U.S. District Court in
Albuquerque.132 The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief from the BLM’s demands, arguing that the WFRHBA
went beyond Congress’s constitutional authority.133
Representing the plaintiffs was George J. Hopkins, who
had represented New Mexico with some success just seventeen
days earlier in another case against the federal government.134
However, that appears to have been his only prior appearance

126. Id.
127. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 532–33.
128. Id. at 533–34.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 534.
131. Id.
132. New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.M. 1975).
133. Id. at 1237–38.
134. New Mexico ex rel. Norvell v. Callaway, 389 F. Supp. 821 (D.N.M. 1975)
(granting only part of the United States’ desired motions to dismiss and for summary judgment). The case challenged refusal of the commanding general of White
Sands Missile Range to allow state agents to enter the range to search for a hidden treasure that “long-lasting legend” said was located somewhere on a mountain within the Range. Id. at 822. As legend had it, the treasure consisted of “gold
bars, jewels, and valuable artifacts.” Id.
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in a federal court. He was an associate in one of New Mexico’s
most prominent and largest law firms; Modrall, Sperling,
Roehl, Harris & Sisk.135 Dick Modrall, one of the firm’s founding partners, was a “cowboy/ranch foreman turned lawyer”136
who no doubt understood the frustrations of public land grazing. On the other side, representing the federal government,
was a Harvard educated, seasoned federal litigator named Victor R. Ortega.137 A native of New Mexico, Ortega had served as
the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Mexico since 1969,
representing the federal government in over one hundred cases.138
A three-judge panel convened in the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Mexico to hear the case. This odd judicial
arrangement was a relic of old federal civil procedure, which
provided that a permanent injunction restraining the enforcement of an Act of Congress on grounds of unconstitutionality
should not be granted unless heard and determined by a threejudge district court.139 The panel consisted of Tenth Circuit
Judge Oliver Seth, Chief District Judge Harry Vearle Payne,
and District Judge Edwin L. Mechem.140 The three judges had
a combined thirty-five years of experience on the bench.141
Seth, who served as Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit from 1977
to 1984, and Mechem were both New Mexico natives, and both
had worked for the federal government prior to joining the
bench.142 Judge Payne was born in a Mormon colony in Chi-

135. III MARTINDALE HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 2748B (1975). Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk was the second largest firm in Albuquerque, and the
state, in 1975. Id. at 2725B–2812B.
136. Our Story, MODRALL SPERLING LAW FIRM, http://www.modrall.com/firm/
our_story (last visited July 26, 2011).
137. Morton, 406 F. Supp. at 1237.
138. A November 16, 2009 search of Westlaw for cases in which Victor R. Ortega represented the United States yielded 120 cases. See Victor R. Ortega,
LAWYERS.COM, http://www.lawyers.com/New-Mexico/Santa-Fe/Victor-R.-Ortega1139049-a.html (last visited June 25, 2011).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970) (repealed 1976).
140. Morton, 406 F. Supp. at 1237.
141. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Seth, Oliver, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2147&cid=999&ctype=na&instate
=na (last visited July 26, 2011); Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Payne,
Harry
Vearle,
supra,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1854&cid=
999&ctype=na&instate=na; Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Mechem,
Edwin Leard, supra, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1608&cid=999
&ctype=na&instate=na.
142. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Seth, Oliver, supra note 141
(Seth served as an Army Major in World War II); Biographical Directory of Fed-
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huahua, Mexico (just south of New Mexico) and did not go to
law school, but rather read law.143
The three-judge panel turned out to be a godsend for the
State, dealing it a resounding victory. It was clear that Congress could legislate “all needful Rules and Regulations” concerning public real estate under the Property Clause.144 But
the court took issue with the idea that wild horses and burros
could “become ‘property’ of the United States simply by being
physically present on the ‘territory’ or land of the United
States.”145 The court’s analysis began with the proposition that
“the common law, dating back to the Roman law, has been that
wild animals are owned by the state in its sovereign capacity,
in trust for the benefit of the people.”146 Reasoning from three
cases that upheld the power of the federal government to kill
deer that were damaging federal lands, the court concluded
that the Property Clause allowed the federal government to
enact regulations only to protect the public lands from damage.147 Because Congress had provided neither any “finding nor
any evidence to indicate that wild horses and burros are damaging the public lands,”148 the panel overturned the WFRHBA
for exceeding the power granted to Congress in the Property
Clause.149
However, the district court opinion left considerable room
for argument on appeal. Congress did, after all, view the feral
equids as a valued cultural and natural resource whose removal from public lands constituted a harm.150 As born westerners
(of Mexico and the United States), all three judges likely were
familiar with ranching and life on the range. Thus, they may
eral Judges: Mechem, Edwin Leard, supra, note 141 (Mechem served as an FBI
agent during World War II).
143. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Payne, Harry Vearle, supra note
141. “Reading law” was a means by which those who did not go to law school could
be admitted to the bar. It involved mostly self-teaching but also guidance by an
experienced attorney or judge. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1377 (9th ed. 2009).
144. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3.
145. Morton, 406 F. Supp. at 1238.
146. Id.
147. Morton, 406 F. Supp. at 1239 (citing Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96
(1928)); see also N.M. State Game Comm’n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir.
1969); Chalk v. United States, 114 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 US.
679 (1941)).
148. Morton, 406 F. Supp. at 1239 (citing Hunt, 278 U.S. 96). Of course, feral
equids do damage to rangeland, but Congress made no such finding because the
statute sought to protect them.
149. Id.
150. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
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have had difficulty seeing the ecological findings as Congress
intended.151 They likely understood the WFRHBA to promote,
rather than prohibit, damage to the rangelands. This cultural
context may help explain why the panel made such an important ruling on the constitutionality of a federal statute in
only a two-page memorandum opinion.
B. Kleppe v. New Mexico
The United States appealed the decision invalidating the
WFRHBA directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, which noted
probable jurisdiction in 1975.152 Then, as now, federal law
permitted appeal of a three-judge district court decision directly to the Supreme Court.153 The stage was set for a dramatic
showdown in Washington.
While the case was on appeal, President Ford nominated
then-Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton, the named defendant in the case and former chairman of the Republican National Committee, to serve as Commerce Secretary.154 Thomas
S. Kleppe, a Republican congressman from North Dakota, replaced Morton as Secretary of the Interior.155 Kleppe was not
known as a champion of wildlife protection—he entered office
approving oil drilling off the Southern California coast and left
office promoting the same on Alaska’s North Slope.156 Nevertheless, federal prerogatives were at stake in the case, and the
transition at the Interior did not alter the course or substance
of the United States’ appeal.
The appeal gained the attention of Wyoming, Idaho, and
Nevada,157 which realized that much more was at stake than
the seized burros.158 Abandoned horse and estray laws, which
151. Id. (finding wild horses are an “integral part of the natural system of the
public lands”).
152. Sec’y of the Interior v. New Mexico, 423 U.S. 818 (1975).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006).
154. Rogers Morton, Official in Nixon, Ford Cabinets, PITT. POST-GAZETTE,
Apr. 20, 1979, at 12.
155. Matt Schudel, Thomas Kleppe, 87; Interior Secretary During Mid-1970s,
WASH.
POST,
Mar.
4,
2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/03/03/AR2007030301196.html.
156. Id. To Secretary Kleppe’s credit, several of his decisions, such as banning
the use of lead shot in waterfowl hunting, were environmentally noteworthy. Id.
157. See infra notes 182–202 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Idaho, Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1974 WL 175952 at *3 [hereinafter Idaho Brief]
(“In this case, much, much more is at issue than the validity of the Wild FreeRoaming Horse and Burro Act.”).
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existed in almost every western state,159 would be preempted
by conflicting provisions of the WFRHBA.160 Moreover, a state
victory would restore the dominant priority ranchers had enjoyed in their competition with feral equids for scarce rangeland resources. A loss, the states feared, would open the door
“for eventual and complete erosion of any state jurisdiction . . .
on federally-owned lands.”161 For Nevada in particular, which
had the largest population of estrays and the second highest
proportion of federal land ownership, the stakes were high.162
Although New Mexico served as a plaintiff in the litigation,
Nevada led the charge for the Sagebrush Rebellion,163 advancing arguments for states’ and ranchers’ interests that
would live on long after the resolution of Kleppe.
1.

The Briefs

The parties’ briefs alone foreshadow the outcome of the
case. The United States asserted that the power of Congress
under the Property Clause to protect feral equids is “beyond
any reasonable doubt.”164 The only restrictions on Congress’s
powers under the Property Clause, the United States argued,
are that the actions must be “needful” and “respecting” federal
land.165 Within those constraints, the Property Clause provides

159. See sources cited supra note 65.
160. Wyoming worried that “without the provisions of the State Estray laws
relative to capture and control of such animals, the local rancher or farmer finds
himself without an effective remedy to prevent disease and/or damage to his livestock.” See Brief of Amici Curiae State of Wyoming Wyoming Livestock Board,
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1976 WL 181209 at *5
(Feb. 17, 1976) [hereinafter Wyoming Brief]. Nevada lamented that if the
WFRHBA survived, “Nevada’s control of estrays would be emasculated.” Brief of
Amici Curiae Nevada State Board of Agriculture Central Committee of Nevada
State Grazing Boards, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488),
1975 WL 173619 at *4 (Aug. 18, 1975) [hereinafter Nevada Board Brief].
161. Idaho Brief, supra note 158, at *3; see also Nevada Board Brief, supra
note 160, at *4–5; Wyoming Brief, supra note 160, at *5.
162. Nevada Board Brief, supra note 160, at *4–5.
163. MICHAEL W. BOWERS, THE SAGEBRUSH STATE: NEVADA’S HISTORY,
GOVERNMENT, AND POLITICS 134 (2006). Former Utah Governor Scott Matheson
described Nevada as assuming leadership of the rebellion. Scott M. Matheson, Rebels Defied Federal Land Dominance, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 22, 1986, at 1A, 4A.
164. Brief for the Secretary of the Interior, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529
(1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173620 at *15 (Dec. 1, 1975) [hereinafter Interior
Brief].
165. Id. at *17.
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Congress with “what are essentially police powers to protect
and preserve the natural resources of the public lands.”166
New Mexico could not muster a persuasive response to the
United States’ arguments. New Mexico argued for a very limited scope of the Property Clause, framing the issue as whether
feral equids “are a part of the federal soil.”167 In addition to its
narrow interpretation of “property,” New Mexico asserted that
only harm-avoiding regulations are “needful,”168 and that Congress erroneously found that equids were at risk of harm.169
Perhaps most detrimental to New Mexico’s case,170 it acknowledged that the burros at issue were seized on BLM lands,171
though New Mexico nevertheless maintained that the burros
spent “the majority of their time on private land.”172 In the debate over the extent of Congress’s authority under the Property
Clause, New Mexico appeared outmatched.
Eleven amicus briefs were filed: four supporting the United
States, six opposing, and one taking a mixed position. In support of the federal government the American Horse Protection
Association,173 the International Association of Game, Fish,
and Conservation Commissioners,174 the Humane Society,175
an author and wild horse conservationist named Hope Ry-

166. Id. at *11.
167. Answer Brief for the State of New Mexico, et al., Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1976 WL 181207 at *9 (Jan. 19, 1976) [hereinafter New Mexico Brief]; see also id. at *15 (arguing that “horses and burros do
not constitute real property”).
168. New Mexico Brief, supra note 167, at *8.
169. Id. at *10–11.
170. See infra notes 231–42 and accompanying text.
171. New Mexico Brief, supra note 167, at *4.
172. Id.
173. Brief of American Horse Protection Ass’n, Amicus Curiae, in Support of
Appellant, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL
173616 (May 30, 1975) [hereinafter AHPA Brief].
174. Brief of Amicus Curiae, International Ass’n of Game, Fish and Conservation Commissioners, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488),
1975 WL 173617 (Aug. 13, 1975). The Association argued that the WFRHBA was
within Congress’s Property Clause authority because feral animals are not wildlife, and therefore not within the management responsibility of the states. Id. at
*5–7. In this respect the Association supported the United States. However, the
Association also opposed the United States by arguing for a narrow interpretation
of the Property Clause. Id. at *12. In this respect, the Association’s position was
mixed.
175. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Humane Society of the United States, Kleppe
v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173622 (Nov. 19,
1975).
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den,176 and Wild Horse Organized Assistance, Inc.177 filed amicus briefs. They argued, among other things, that the holding
of the court below jeopardized “[p]ast and future legislation enacted pursuant to the Territory and Property Clause establishing national forests and public parks and providing protection
for wildlife therein.”178
The United States also worried that the trial court’s narrow interpretation of the Property Clause might seriously undermine federal agencies’ ability to manage the public lands.
The Justice Department’s brief noted that the very permit authorizing Stephenson to graze his cattle on public land could be
unconstitutional if the Property Clause allowed Congress to act
only on harm-avoidance grounds.179 Other routine public land
management activities, such as the manipulation of elk populations in the National Elk Refuge, would be difficult to justify
under the terms of the lower court’s ruling.180 Moreover, the
boundary between avoiding harm and producing benefits is notoriously muddled, and has vexed takings law for decades.181
Applying the harm-avoidance principle to police congressional
compliance with the Property Clause would invite endless litigious mischief.
Among the amici supporting the State of New Mexico were
the Nevada State Board of Agriculture,182 the Nevada Central
Committee of Grazing Boards,183 the Pacific Legal Founda-

176. Brief of Amicus Curiae Hope Ryden, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529
(1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173621 (Nov. 17, 1975). Ms. Ryden also testified at
length in the hearings that led to the passage of the WFRHBA. See, e.g., House
Hearings, supra note 65, at 134–42.
177. Brief of Amicus Curiae Wild Horse Organized Assistance, Inc., Kleppe v.
New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173624 (Nov. 20, 1975).
178. E.g., AHPA Brief, supra note 173, at *8.
179. Interior Brief, supra note 164, at *18.
180. See Robert L. Fischman & Angela King, Savings Clauses and Trends in
Natural Resources Federalism, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 131–
41 (2007) (discussing elk management controversy in the refuge, and its conflict
between Wyoming and the United States).
181. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024–27 (1992)
(“[T]he distinction between ‘harm-preventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’ regulation is
often in the eye of the beholder.”).
182. Brief of Amicus Curiae Nevada State Board of Agriculture, Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173627 (Jan. 2, 1975).
183. Brief of Amicus Curiae Nevada State Board of Agriculture Central Committee of Nevada State Grazing Boards, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529
(1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173619 (Aug. 18, 1975).
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tion,184 the State of Idaho,185 and the Wyoming Livestock
Board.186 The states took a shotgun approach to the case, attacking the WFRHBA on every conceivable front, while at the
same time defending against the argument that the holding below would threaten other environmental legislation.187 Nevada,
for example, claimed that the “ ‘parade of horribles’ just cannot
be supported in the law”188 because the constitutional infirmity
is unique to the WFRHBA. Specifically, Nevada argued that
other environmental laws, such as the National Wildlife Refuge
System Act189 and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,190 were
“self-cleansing—they contain either specific language ruling
against such confrontation with State fish and game laws, or
they are easily distinguished.”191
The Pacific Legal Foundation, founded just two years earlier, made essentially the same points as New Mexico.192 Idaho,
on the other hand, took a more extreme position and attacked
the idea of protecting the horses and burros as “absurd.”193
Idaho’s Attorney General, Warren Felton, offered the following
alternative to the Act:
Rather than preserve degenerate estrays, it is better to look
backward to that which once was, and cease thinking of
perpetuating that which does not exist. Texas has the idea.
Build a statue to the horse that used to be, make it life size,
include a stallion, some mares, and a few colts. Let this
bronze symbol stand in a public place so that generations
that are to come may see the type of horse that contributed
the base stock to the Western range horse industry. And on
this statue carve a caption taken from a letter to Life protesting the destruction of the wild horse herds in recent
years: “Son, that is what was once known as the Western
184. Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173626
(Aug. 14, 1975) [hereinafter PLF Brief].
185. Idaho Brief, supra note 158.
186. Wyoming Brief, supra note 160.
187. See, e.g., Nevada Board Brief, supra note 160, at *11.
188. Id. at *9.
189. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd, ee (2006).
190. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2006).
191. Nevada Board Brief, supra note 160, at *11.
192. PLF Brief, supra note 184. The Foundation would later play an important
role in the political movements spawned in reaction to the environmental legislation of the 1970s, especially in defending private property owners harmed by regulation. See Environmental Regulation Cases, PAC. LEGAL FOUND.,
http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=270 (last visited July 26, 2011).
193. Idaho Brief, supra note 158, at *5.
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pony.”194

Certainly this position was inconsistent with the broad
public sentiment that led Congress to pass the Act,195 and it
can perhaps be best explained as evidence of just how frustrated western states had become in trying to deal with the increasing dominance of federal control of the public rangelands.
In this regard, these arguments foreshadowed a looming political rebellion. The Wyoming Livestock Board, on the other
hand, offered no novel position and merely adopted the position
of the State of New Mexico and the Nevada State Board of Agriculture.196
The case was of particular interest to Nevada, because it
had been making the same argument as New Mexico—that the
WFRHBA is unconstitutional and that wild and free-roaming
equids belong to the states—in a separate controversy.197 Furthermore, Nevada’s ability to control horses on the public lands
was of special import because the federal government owns
such a large proportion of its land area, more than 80 percent.198 Nevada thus saw the Act as interfering with its police
powers, arguing that “Nevada should be able to control estrays,
diseased animals, fish and game and promote range management within the boundaries of Nevada. Should these obvious
rights under the State’s police powers be stripped, state sovereignty is necessarily questioned.”199 Robert List, Nevada’s Attorney General, hence asserted that if the Act were upheld,
Wyoming, Nevada, and New Mexico “will have been admitted
into the Union, not as an equal member, but as one shorn of a
legislative power vested in all the other States of the Union, a
power resulting from the fact of statehood and incident to its
194. Id. at *5 (quoting WALKER D. WYMAN, THE WILD HORSE OF THE WEST
(1962)) (emphasis added).
195. One author captured this sentiment by describing the wild horse as follows: “ ‘[t]he most beautiful, the most spirited and the most inspiring creature ever to print foot on the grasses of America.’ ” Richard H. Gilluly, The Mustang Controversy, 99 SCI. NEWS 219, 220 (1971) (quoting author J. Frank Dobie).
196. Wyoming Brief, supra note 160. Wyoming instead chose to illustrate the
factual circumstances of free roaming equids in Wyoming.
197. SYMANSKI, supra note 63, at 129 (Nevada’s State Agricultural Director
impounded eighty wild horses rounded up by BLM, claiming that the Act was unconstitutional and that the horses belonged to the state). This controversy eventually came before the courts in American Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Frizzell, 403 F.
Supp. 1206 (D. Nev. 1975), but the State did not raise the issues of state ownership and the constitutionality of the Act.
198. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
199. Brief for Nevada State Board of Agriculture, supra note 182, at *12.
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plenary existence.”200 Again, the states’ arguments suggested
something of greater political consequence than the mere management of wild horses. The equal footing argument, which
would remain a complaint of Nevada’s for many years,201 as
well as the states’ other arguments concerning the Tenth
Amendment and state police powers,202 began to frame a public
lands conflict that would long outlive the Kleppe dispute.
2.

The Argument

Deputy solicitor general and adjunct professor of law at
Georgetown, Arthur Raymond Randolph, Jr., represented the
United States before the Supreme Court.203 He graduated at
the top of his class from the University of Pennsylvania Law
School and is now a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.204 Apparently New Mexico was
impressed with Randolph’s performance, for he later served the
state as Special Assistant Attorney General from 1985 to 1990.
Given its success in the district court, New Mexico stuck
with Modrall Sperling to advocate for its interests before the
Supreme Court. For this task, the firm called on veteran litigator George T. Harris, Jr., a former president of the New Mexico
Bar Association,205 who had twice before unsuccessfully represented New Mexico as a special assistant attorney general in
petitions for certiorari to the Court.206
Oral arguments took place on March 23, 1976, and Deputy
Solicitor Randolph performed brilliantly. From the outset,
members of the Court challenged Randolph to define the limits
of Congress’s Property Clause power, questioning whether
Congress could protect wild equids on private land.207 Randolph explained that protecting horses and burros on private
200. Id. at *13 (citing Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896)).
201. See infra text accompanying notes 303–10.
202. See, e.g., Idaho Brief, supra note 158, at *2; New Mexico Brief, supra note
167, at *12–13; Wyoming Brief, supra note 160, at *5.
203. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Randolph, Arthur Raymond,
supra note 141, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1964&cid=999&ctype=
na&instate=na.
204. Id.
205. Past
Presidents,
N.M.
BAR
ASS’N,
http://www.nmbar.org/
AboutSBNM/Governance/pastpresidents.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
206. See N.M. State Game Comm’n v. Hickel, 396 U.S. 961 (1969); N.M. State
Game Comm’n v. U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit, 396 U.S. 953 (1969).
207. Oral Argument at 3:09, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No.
74-1488), available at www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1488.
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land was not at issue in the case because New Mexico had
seized the burros on public, not private, land.208 Justice Stevens was not easily persuaded, referring to the trial court’s
opinion which stated that “[t]he controversy involved here began when a New Mexico rancher . . . discovered several unbranded and unclaimed burros wandering on his private land .
. . and also on public land.”209 Randolph held his ground, arguing that regardless of the language of the district court opinion,
Congress’s power to protect wild horses and burros on private
land was not at issue.210
Randolph analogized the case to Light v. United States,211
one of the seminal Supreme Court decisions establishing federal natural resource management authority over public lands.212
He argued that if Congress could restrict access to the public
lands then so too could Congress prohibit harm to animals living on the public lands.213 He also likened the WFRHBA to the
sixth century Justinian right of a landowner to prevent others
from killing animals on his land.214 Randolph noted that the
WFRHBA passed both houses of Congress unanimously and
the governor of Nevada, the state with the largest population of
wild equids, wrote letters to both the Senate and the House expressing support for the Act.215

208. Id. at 5:18.
209. Id. at 29:40–32:05; see also Morton, supra note 119, at 1237.
210. Oral Argument, supra note 207, at 30:10. One vexing problem with the
Kleppe story is explaining why New Mexico chose the Stephenson case instead of
waiting for the federal government to use its WFRHBA authority to protect animals at the time they were roaming on private land. Such facts would have made
a better challenge to the Property Clause authority of the United States than the
Stephenson circumstances, where the New Mexico Livestock Board rounded up
the animals on BLM land. However, the federal enforcement authorities were
loath to preempt state estray laws on private land, so no opportunity would likely
arise for the state to have chosen the more favorable fact pattern.
Similarly, Stephenson could have sought mandamus to force the BLM to
act with dispatch to remove wild horses on his private lands. While that tactic
was successful in the courts, see, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799
F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986), it does not raise the grand constitutional issues that
rally movements.
211. 220 U.S. 523 (1911); see also the companion case to Light, United States v.
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
212. Oral Argument, supra note 207, at 20:45.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 19:40.
215. Near the end of the argument the bench signaled its view that the issues
at stake were minimal. One Justice stated that Randolph probably drew straws
for this case. Randolph answered, “[a]nd I lost,” to which the Justices responded
with laughter. Id. at 25:45.
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George Harris was outmatched. He conceded that the burros at issue were not seized on private land, which opened the
door to an onslaught of challenges.216 Time and again, the Justices questioned how New Mexico could have standing to bring
arguments about Congress’s power to protect wild equids on
private land given Harris’s concession that the burros at issue
were not seized on private land.217 Harris was without response, stating at one point: “I’m sorry, I’m not sure I’m following here.”218
3.

The Decision

On June 17, 1976, in one of two unanimous opinions written by Justice Marshall and issued that day,219 the Supreme
Court handed the western states a crushing defeat. Summarily
dismissing New Mexico’s arguments, the Court reached back to
a long line of cases endorsing broad federal resource management to declare that “ ‘[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.’ ”220
The Court unpacked the lawsuit into four main issues: (1)
the scope of the challenge to the WFRHBA; (2) the breadth of
federal power authorized by the Property Clause; (3) the distinction between the Property Clause and the Enclave Clause;
and (4) the division of jurisdiction between the state and federal government on public land. These issues closely track the
four sections of the Court’s opinion.
Narrowly defining the constitutional issues raised by the
WFRHBA, the Court proceeded on the basis that the dispute
concerned only federal authority over wildlife on public lands.
Though the protection of the Act extends to horses and burros
on either public or private land,221 the state’s counsel had
acknowledged at oral argument that the roaming burros were
rounded up on public land.222 The Court therefore reserved the
216. Id. at 36:56.
217. Id. at 37:27, 39:36, 40:48, 42:10, 43:40, 44:50.
218. Id. at 46:18.
219. See Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
220. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (citing United States v.
San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)). As early as United States v. Gratiot, 39
U.S. 526 (1840), the Court interpreted the Property Clause power to vest “without
limitation.” See also Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”:
The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1 (2001).
221. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 531–32.
222. Id. at 534 & n.3.
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more troublesome and inflammatory issue of federal authority
over private land, stating: “[W]e do not think it appropriate . . .
to determine the extent, if any, to which the Property Clause
empowers Congress to protect animals on private lands or the
extent to which such regulation is attempted by the Act.”223
With the scope of the state’s challenge so cabined, the
Court held that the WFRHBA as applied to public land falls
within congressional authority under the Property Clause. The
state’s construction of the Property Clause purported to limit
federal authority to (1) “the power to dispose of and make incidental rules regarding use of federal property; and (2) the power to protect federal property,” meaning the land itself.224 New
Mexico argued that the WFRHBA’s wildlife protection extended beyond the boundaries of the Property Clause because it
failed to protect the realty itself. This is the essence of the district court’s opinion in New Mexico v. Morton.225
Rejecting New Mexico’s “narrow reading” of the Property
Clause as inconsistent with a long line of case law, the Court
endorsed an “expansive reading” of the clause.226 Kleppe reiterated that congressional power over the public lands is “without
limitations.”227 While it does not possess a general police power, “Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a
legislature over the public domain,”228 which “necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife living
there.”229
Arguing that the WFRHBA was not based on science and
actually harms the public lands, New Mexico attempted to
prompt the Court to question the empirical connection between
the terms of the law and the aims of the Property Clause. In a
footnote dismissal, the Court declined the invitation to “reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of
223. Id. at 546. Many commentators in the years after Kleppe attempted to address this question regarding the scope of the Property Clause. See, e.g., Jennifer
Pruett Loehr, Expansive Reading of Property Clause Upheld, 23 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 197 (1983) (discussing cases decided in years following Kleppe); Plumb, supra
note 23, at 189 (predicting “erosion of states’ control over hunting and fishing
within their borders” and the “expansion of federal control in areas others than
wildlife regulation”); Shepard, supra note 23 (arguing limitations on Property
Clause should come from political process and not courts).
224. Kleppe, 426 U.S at 536.
225. 406 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.M. 1975).
226. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 540.
229. Id. at 541.
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Congress.”230 Courts inevitably will decide challenges to statutes passed pursuant to the Property Clause, but the standard
of review will be lenient, as exemplified in Kleppe. Thus, Kleppe
signals that the Court will rely primarily on the political process to place limits on the exercise of the Property Clause.231
The Kleppe opinion also made clear that the Property
Clause is a stand-alone basis for federal authority on public
lands. New Mexico relied on the Enclave Clause to argue that
the federal government could not supplant state police power
under the New Mexico Estray Law without first obtaining the
state’s consent.232 The Constitution’s Enclave Clause is a separate source of federal authority for certain enumerated purposes,233 which requires state consent for the transfer of jurisdiction. The state can cede exclusive or partial jurisdiction to the
federal government, thereby extinguishing state police power
over the land to the extent such power is transferred.234 Under
the Property Clause, in contrast, no state consent is necessary.
The Court held that the federal government possesses preemptive jurisdiction over the public domain under the Property
Clause even if it does not secure jurisdiction under the Enclave
Clause.235
In response to the state’s claims that the WFRHBA intruded upon sovereign police powers, the Court stated that “[t]he
230. Id. at 541 n.10. According to the Court, determinations of what are “needful” rules “respecting” the public lands under the Property Clause “are entrusted
primarily to the judgment of Congress.” Id. at 536.
231. Deference to Congress’s decisions about the scope of its constitutional
power is much discussed in the literature. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). The Supreme
Court took a dramatically less deferential approach to congressional findings in
interpreting the Commerce Clause, beginning in the 1990s. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). It remains unclear the extent to which the disparity
between Kleppe and Lopez is a function of the difference between the two constitutional clauses, or between the attitudes of the Court in two different eras.
232. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 542.
233. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Granting Congress the power:
[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular
States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the
Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockYards, and other needful Buildings.
Id.
234. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 542.
235. Id. at 542–43.
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Act does not establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over the
public lands in New Mexico; it merely overrides the New Mexico Estray Law insofar as the state agency attempts to regulate
federally protected animals.”236 Congress and the states exercise concurrent, not mutually exclusive, jurisdiction over the
public domain. To the extent that the laws of each conflict, federal law is supreme and preempts inconsistent state law. Despite New Mexico’s lamentations, the states retain considerable
authority over public lands in the absence of federal legislation
or regulation. Indeed, the states retain “broad trustee and police powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions.”237
This may be little solace to the states—exercising power only to
the extent the federal government has not acted—but it is not
insignificant or unconstitutional.
Thus, Kleppe slammed the door shut on challenges to federal control of the public rangelands.238 The decision undoubtedly “sharpened the ranching community’s attention to the finer points of constitutional law,”239 while leaving Nevada to
wonder what to make of its equal-footing claim.
Although Kleppe was unanimous, the papers of Justice
Marshall suggest that there was some debate among the Justices. The trove of Marshall materials contains a cryptic note
from Chief Justice Burger regarding Kleppe v. New Mexico,
dated a few days before the Court issued its judgment:
[The] enthusiasm that the rancher-water Justices exhibited
for my scholarly analysis of the grazing problems leads me
to abandon the idea of separate writing. I assumed ranchers
would want to be free to shoot trespassing burros but if Byron [White] and Bill Rehnquist want to put wild burros on a
new form of “welfare” I will submit. In short, I join you.240

While the “ranchers” on the Court endorsed Justice Marshall’s opinion, the Kleppe decision inflamed the public land
ranchers in the West. The following part explores the Sagebrush Rebellion that resulted.
236. Id. at 545.
237. Id.
238. George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Power, Procedure, and
Policy in Public Lands and Resources Law, NAT. RES. & ENV’T, no. 10, 1995, at 3,
4.
239. Sally Fairfax, Old Recipes for New Federalism, 12 ENVTL. L. 945, 971
(1982).
240. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights
from the Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10606, 10617 (1993).
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III. THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION
Federal ownership of western lands powerfully shapes the
regional economy and society. Along with aridity, it is perhaps
the defining characteristic of the West.241 Though a national
park can be a source of pride, most federal land ownership (especially BLM jurisdiction) “has always been a politically attractive whipping boy for western politicians.”242 Federal proprietary control and relatively unproductive rangelands prompted
the Kleppe controversy; it should be no surprise that the Supreme Court decision did not quell the “disaffection with national government”243 that permeated western states. Indeed, it
helped propel a political response that grew in importance up
to and through the election of self-identified “sagebrush rebel,”
Ronald Reagan.244
The Sagebrush Rebellion began as narrowly focused
rancher frustration with the WFRHBA, and in less than half a
decade grew to encompass a wide array of public land conflicts.
After the crushing defeat of Kleppe, Nevada grabbed the baton
and led the movement for greater state control of public lands,
advancing a regional political agenda. As Nevada pressed forward, Congress enacted a more comprehensive public rangelands management reform statute. That legislation helped
draw more stakeholders into the rebellion.
This Part focuses on two statutes that fomented subsequent conflicts over federal natural resources, further stoking
the Sagebrush Rebellion. The first is the 1976 Federal Land
245
Policy and Management Act,
which helped spread western
disgruntlement beyond ranchers in the wake of Kleppe. The
statute provided special avenues for states to influence federal
public land management through cooperative federalism, and
its implementation neglected to significantly change the extent
of grazing on public lands. Nonetheless, it sparked more western grievances. The second statute is the 1979 Nevada law as246
serting proprietary control over federal public lands.
That
law inspired other states to enact similar declarations. Histori241. Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 955.
242. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 24, at 76.
243. Id.; see also John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317, 343 (1980).
244. Leshy, supra note 243, at 354–55 & n.116.
245. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)).
246. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 321.5973(1) (LexisNexis 2008).
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an Patricia Limerick identifies the Nevada statute as the opening salvo of the Sagebrush Rebellion,247 but the legislation’s
roots extend to the WFRHBA and discontent with Kleppe. This
Part concludes with a description of Nevada’s failed judicial
challenge to the 1976 Act, punctuating another cycle in the development of the Sagebrush Rebellion, which continued to feed
on discontent generated, in part, from judicial losses. The story
of these legal developments following Kleppe highlights “uncooperative federalism” as a key strategy of western states resisting federal limitations on longstanding public land users.
A. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act
Even as the litigation over the WFRHBA wound down,
Congress considered a score of bills to reduce overgrazing and
bring a more systematic approach to management of the unreserved public lands, which had not yet been removed from the
disposal laws facilitating privatization.248 On October 21, 1976,
four months after the Court issued the opinion in Kleppe, Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA).249 After decades of administrative drift, FLPMA
provided the BLM with organic legislation, a comprehensive
legislative charter for the largest public land system in the
United States.250 Although FLPMA retained much of the Taylor Grazing Act and so stopped short of a thorough overhaul of
the law of livestock grazing,251 it dramatically shifted the center of gravity in land management on public lands. The FLPMA
brought comprehensive, pluralistic planning to the BLM.252 It
imposed on the public rangelands the multiple-use, sustainedyield rubric,253 which had been the guiding legislative mandate
247. PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN
PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST 46 (1987).
248. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES, supra note 19, at 2304.
249. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 90 Stat. 2744.
250. See Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the
Hallmarks of Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 501–10 (2002)
(discussing various meanings of organic legislation).
251. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 24, at 799.
252. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006). Oliver Houck argues that Nat. Res. Def.
Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C.
Cir.), paved the way for long-range planning on BLM lands by imposing NEPA
environmental impact analysis on the grazing districts. Houck, The Water, the
Trees, and the Land, supra note 22, at 2305–08.
253. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(7), 1702(c) (2006). In a certain sense, the WFRHBA
had already brought multiple-use management to the public rangelands by raising the priority of horses, an aesthetic land use, to at least the same level as
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of the national forests since 1960.254 This shift in legislative
policy meant that grazing no longer claimed dominant status
on the rangelands.255 Indeed, FLPMA placed new environmental restrictions on BLM authority, including limits on grazing
that caused unnecessary and undue degradation.256 Now
ranchers would have to compete not only with wild horses and
burros, but also with anyone else who wanted to use the public
lands, including recreationists and environmentalists. In addition to providing the BLM with expansive rangeland management authority, including the ability to designate and regulate
areas of critical environmental concern,257 FLPMA explicitly
affirmed that “the public lands [will] be retained in Federal
ownership.”258 Frustrations boiled over again, and the combination of Kleppe and FLPMA prompted the coalescence of a political movement to limit federal management that reduced the
influence of ranchers and other traditional users of the public
lands: the “Sagebrush Rebellion.”259
Some commentators date the start of the Sagebrush Rebellion as late as 1979.260 Most mark the passage of FLPMA in
1976 as the triggering event.261 This story of Kleppe supports

ranching, the former dominant use. See House Hearings, supra note 65, at 103
(testimony of Michael J. Pontrelli, Assistant Professor of Biology, University of
Nevada, Reno) (arguing against livestock dominant use and in favor of multiple
use management to protect horses).
254. Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528–531 (2006).
255. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. BLM, 140 I.B.L.A. 85, 99–101 (1997). In practice,
ranchers remained successful in dominating grazing use decisions on BLM lands.
Joseph M. Feller, Back to the Present: The Supreme Court Refuses to Move Public
Range Law Backward, but Will the BLM Move Public Range Management Forward?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10021, 10021, 10025 (2001); see also Joseph M. Feller,
What Is Wrong With the BLM’s Management of Livestock Grazing on the Public
Lands?, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 555, 570 (1994).
256. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006).
257. Id. § 1701(a)(11).
258. Id. § 1701(a)(1).
259. Dale D. Goble, Public Lands and Agricultural Pollution, 30 IDAHO L. REV.
433, 437 (1994).
260. See, e.g., LIMERICK, supra note 247, at 46; Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and
the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12
ENVTL. L. 847, 848 (1982); A. Costandina Titus, The Nevada “Sagebrush Rebellion” Act: A Question of Constitutionality, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 263, 263–64 (1981) (dating the “Sagebrush Rebellion” to the formation of the Western Coalition in 1978);
Ed Quillen, Ronald Reagan: The Accidental Environmentalist, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Jan. 10, 2011, http://www.hcn.org/articles/ronald-reagan-the-accidentalenvironmentalist/.
261. Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues
Surrounding Federal Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PAC. L.J. 693, 694 (1981);
Leshy, supra note 243, at 341.
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an earlier origin: the enactment of the 1971 WFRHBA.262 The
WFRHBA was the first congressional enactment reforming
public land law in the modern environmental era. Kleppe was
the first in a line of lawsuits lashing back at the modern
framework of allocating scarce public natural resources.
Of course, dating the start of any political movement entails some arbitrary line drawing. Professor Goble describes
antecedents to the Sagebrush Rebellion that date back to Tennessee’s 1799 claim to the public domain within its borders.263
In 1955, the western commentator, Bernard DeVoto, identified
interest groups supporting a version of “home rule which
means basically that we want federal help without federal regulation.”264 From this perspective, the Sagebrush Rebellion is a
modern efflorescence of a perennial public-land state complaint. The Sagebrush Rebellion is a recent chapter written out
of frustration with the legislation of the 1970s.265
Former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, as prominent an opponent of the Sagebrush Rebellion as any the West
has produced, cautioned that:
It is easy to dismiss the motives of the small group of
stockmen and their political allies who have revived the rallying cry of states’ rights for their own benefit. But the considerable support that the Sagebrush Rebellion has gained
in the West reflects a deep-seated frustration with . . . federal regulation of public lands. Many westerners share
growing dissatisfaction with the way federal lands are managed. . . . As the fastest growing region in the country, the
West cannot afford to be unable to plan its future development.266

Congress (especially through the committees that drafted
FLPMA, which were dominated by westerners) responded to
262. Cf. Fairfax, supra note 239, at 970–71 (highlighting Kleppe among the
three main events triggering the rebellion); Goble, supra note 259, at 437 (pairing
enactment of FLPMA with the Kleppe decision to date the rebellion to 1976).
263. Goble, supra note 259, at 438; see also DANIEL FELLER, PUBLIC LANDS IN
JACKSONIAN POLITICS 163, 166 (1984) (documenting many state objections to federal retention of public lands in the early nineteenth century).
264. BERNARD DEVOTO, THE EASY CHAIR 254–55 (1995).
265. R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER: THE
SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND WESTERN POLITICS 71–76 (1993); see also Richard D.
Clayton, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public Lands, 1980
UTAH L. REV. 505, 509–11 (1980) (identifying western ineffectiveness in Congress
and adverse federal regulation as two causes of the Sagebrush Rebellion).
266. Babbitt, supra note 260, at 853.
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the legitimate western state claims of a special interest in public rangelands. It peppered FLPMA with several provisions inviting states to influence federal management through the tools
of cooperative federalism.267 The BLM resource management
plans, in particular, must be attentive to state and local management goals.268 The legislation promotes consistency in
planning between levels of government.269 But the Sagebrush
Rebellion had little patience for jumping through the hoops to
qualify for FLPMA consideration. What distinguished the
Sagebrush Rebellion from other efforts to promote traditional
and local economic interests was its rejection of cooperative
federalism. Instead, the rebellion chose to push what we call
“un-cooperative federalism.”270
The following two subparts show how Nevada led the
charge to advance the Sagebrush Rebellion by employing “uncooperative federalism,” first in state legislation challenging
federal control of public lands and second in litigation seeking
to overturn FLPMA.
B. Nevada’s Assembly Bill 413
Recall that New Mexico had not been alone in its fight with
the federal government. In its brief to the Supreme Court, New
Mexico had urged the Court to consider briefs filed by other
western states, including Nevada, Idaho, and Wyoming.271 Nevada had expressed particular interest in the issue, with its
Board of Agriculture filing three separate amicus briefs.272 Like

267. Cooperative federalism is an arrangement of power under which a national government induces coordination from subordinate jurisdictions. Robert L.
Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 179, 200 (2005); see also Fischman & King, supra note 180, at 147, 152–53,
162 (discussing how FLPMA manifests cooperative federalism).
268. 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006).
269. Id.; see also infra notes 315–23 and accompanying text (discussing how
cooperative federalism works in the FLPMA).
270. See supra note 18, for other uses of “un-cooperative federalism.”
271. Answer Brief for the State of New Mexico, et al., Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1448), 1976 WL 181207, at *35.
272. See Brief of Amici Curiae on the Merits Central Committee of Nevada
State Grazing Boards and Duckwater Shoshone Tribe, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426
U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1448), 1975 WL 173625; Brief of Amici Curiae Nevada
State Board of Agriculture Central Committee of Nevada State Grazing Boards,
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1448), 1975 WL 173619; Brief
of Amicus Curiae Nevada State Board of Agriculture, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426
U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1448), 1975 WL 173627.
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its fellow amici in the Kleppe litigation, Nevada contains substantial amounts of federally-owned land.273
From the perspective of these states, federal legislation
like the FLPMA and the WFRBHA were burdens unfairly imposed by Washington outsiders who knew little about life on
the range.274 The general sentiment was that “the policy arena
was distinctly biased in favor of environmental values.”275 Such
sentiments arose for a variety of reasons, including the fact
that the BLM’s only effective tool for managing horse and burro
populations in accordance with the law was to reduce livestock
grazing allotments.276 But what fundamentally stoked the rebellion was the ranchers’ loss of control over federal lands. Until the WFRBHA, “overt competition for use of specific areas of
public lands” was rare, and local ranchers held sway over
rangelands.277 And, as the comments of one Nevada jurist reflect, the ends of federal policies sometimes appeared dubious
from a westerner’s perspective: “Congress bought into politically correct, ecologically buffoonish arguments and tried to create
a national symbol out of the inbred great grandson of somebody’s plow horse.”278 Thus, many westerners concluded that
federal environmental legislation was nothing more than “a
ploy of an upper-class elite that wanted to preserve its pristine

273. The federal government owns 83 percent of the land in Nevada, 63 percent in Alaska, 65 percent in Utah, 53 percent in Oregon, 63 percent in Idaho, 45
percent in Arizona, 49 percent in Wyoming, and 34 percent in New Mexico.
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS
2000, at tbl.1-3 (2000), available at http://www.blm.gov/public_land_stati
stics/pls00/index.html (follow “Table 1-3” hyperlink).
274. See generally SYMANSKI, supra note 63.
275. CAWLEY, supra note 265, at 69.
276. Id. at 51 (“Because grazing forage is a scarce resource, the allocation of
AUMs is a zero-sum game in which providing for one group of animals means reducing forage for another group.”); see also Pitt, supra note 57, at 513. Somewhat
surprisingly, one federal official testified to Congress that protecting wild horses
would not require reductions in livestock grazing permits. House Hearings, supra
note 65, at 69 (testimony of Edward P. Cliff, Chief, Forest Service).
277. Leshy, supra note 11, at 345.
278. David R. Gamble, Max Allred, Desperado, NEV. LAWYER, Mar. 1998, at 25
(describing WFRHBA). In their amici brief in Kleppe, Nevada’s grazing and agricultural boards described themselves as the “knowledgeable, actual users of the
western range . . . .” Brief of Amici Curiae Nevada State Board of Agriculture
Central Committee of Nevada State Grazing Boards, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426
U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173619, at *4.
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playground at the expense of those who needed to use the nation’s resources for survival.”279
Frustrated by Congress and rebuffed by the courts, Nevada
reasserted the traditional, pre-WFRHBA influence over the
public rangelands through “un-cooperative federalism” involving direct challenges to federal authority. The Nevada legislature began studying public land policy reform in 1975,280 while
Kleppe was on appeal. Decrying the “uneven quality and sometimes arbitrary and capricious” nature of federal land management and its effects on livestock and mining, the Nevada
legislature directed its commission to explore how to secure
greater control over public lands through federal political and
judicial processes.281 Six months after the Kleppe decision, the
commission reported to the legislature.282 Referring to Kleppe,
the legislative counsel advised the commission that due to “the
machinations of the Supreme Court,”283 Nevada had no legal
claim to the public lands.284 The counsel complained similarly
of Congress.285 Nonetheless, the commission saw political value
in pursuing additional litigation “to reinforce other arguments .
. . involving federal-state controversies.”286 In this regard, Nevada recognized that even unsuccessful litigation could play an
important role in furthering the agenda of increasing state influence over federal resource management. Because the commission completed its findings before the passage of FLPMA,287
the legislative counsel’s complaint against Congress may be
traced to the WFRHBA.
In response to the commission’s report, the legislature created the Select Committee on Public Lands in 1977 to rally
support for state control of public lands.288 The six Nevada
279. WILLIAM E. PEMBERTON, EXIT WITH HONOR 119 (1998) (quoting one sagebrush rebel describing wild horse and burro protections as follows: “They want
food for the soul. We need food for the body.”).
280. S. Con. Res. 35, 1975 Leg., 59th Sess. (Nev. 1975).
281. Id.
282. NEV. LEGIS. COMM’N OF THE LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, MEANS OF
DERIVING ADDITIONAL STATE BENEFITS FROM PUBLIC LANDS, Bulletin No. 77-6,
58th Sess., at 3 (Dec. 1976).
283. Id. at 65.
284. Id. at 16.
285. Id. at 65.
286. Id. at 16.
287. Id. at 24–25.
288. A Guide to the Records of Sagebrush Rebellion Collection No. 85-04, U. OF
NEV., RENO, MATHEWSON-IGT KNOWLEDGE CENTER, http://www.knowledgecenter
.unr.edu/specoll/mss/85-04.html (last updated June 22, 2008). The Select Committee was, at the time, unique in the annals of the Nevada legislature. NEV. LEGIS.
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lawmakers appointed to the Committee pushed forward Assembly Bill 413, now known as the Sagebrush Rebellion Bill.289
The Bill passed the sixty-member Nevada legislature in 1979,
calling for the state to take control of roughly 48 million acres
of federally-owned, BLM-managed land located within its borders.290 The law declared that “all public lands in Nevada and
all minerals not previously appropriated are the property of the
State of Nevada and subject to its jurisdiction and control.”291
It also granted to the state land office the authority “to convey,
lease, license or permit the use of public lands to the same extent . . . [as] the Federal Government.”292 In other words, the
Bill authorized the state land office to dispose of federal
lands.293 “According to the authors of Assembly Bill 413, the
Sagebrush Rebellion was fueled by the perception that the federal government was both ignorant and unsympathetic to the
impact of its policies on the West.”294 Addressing the Kleppe
controversy specifically, one Nevada sagebrush rebel legislator
said, “[s]ome of those people from Washington ought to see
what a wild horse will do to a range and a watering hole.”295
Seeking to rally political support for its “un-cooperative
federalism,” Nevada hosted a conference of western states likely to be sympathetic to its cause.296 The conference was an
overwhelming success. Not only did Nevada receive the support
of the Western Council of State Governments and the Western
COMM’N OF THE LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, SELECT COMM. ON PUB. LANDS,
BULLETIN NO. 79-19: REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION, 4 (1978) [hereinafter SELECT COMM. ON PUB. LANDS].
289. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 321.596–.599 (1979). See generally Titus, supra note
260.
290. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 321.5973(1) (LexisNexis 2008).
291. Id.
292. Id. § 321.598(1).
293. Id.
294. LISA SCHOCH-ROBERTS, NAT’L PARK SERV., A CLASSIC WESTERN
QUARREL: A HISTORY OF THE ROAD CONTROVERSY AT COLORADO NATIONAL
MONUMENT (quoting CAWLEY, supra note 265, at 96), available at
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/colm/adhi1-preface.htm; see also
SELECT COMM. ON PUB. LANDS, supra note 288, at 6 (decrying the federal government’s “lack of awareness of the impact of federal lands on state and local governments”).
295. Joseph Seldner, The Sagebrush Rebellion, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 1980, at 1
(quoting State Sen. Keith Ashworth; “a leader in the early Sagebrush Rebellion”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
296. SELECT COMM. ON PUB. LANDS, supra note 288, at 8 (referring to a meeting held in Carson City in 1977); Titus, supra note 260, at 263–64 (marking the
1978 agreement from the Nevada meeting as the moment that the Sagebrush Rebellion transformed from “attitude to actuality”).
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Interstate Region of the National Association of Counties, but
the conference also led to the formation of the Western Coalition on Public Lands,297 a primary proponent of the “wise use”
movement.298 The “wise use” slogan was an outgrowth of the
Sagebrush Rebellion and would outlast the Rebellion as a rallying point for ranchers and other western commodity interests.
More importantly, several western states passed their own
versions of Assembly Bill 413. Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah
enacted bills similar to Assembly Bill 413 that called for state
ownership of BLM lands.299 The Arizona legislature even overrode Governor Bruce Babbitt’s veto.300 While Nevada pioneered
legislative attempts to wrest control of public lands from the
BLM, Wyoming took the approach one step further and laid
claim not only to BLM lands but also to all Forest Service lands
within its borders.301 The legislatures of California, Colorado,
and Idaho took the more tempered and less confrontational
route of calling for feasibility studies of transferring federally
owned lands to state ownership.302
C. Nevada’s Judicial Challenge to FLPMA
Legislative declarations like Assembly Bill 413 were largely symbolic, for they could not control federal management decisions. But they were rallying points for asserting political arguments about unfair imposition of federal will upon western
public land users. Similarly, attacks on federal authority
through litigation could not reasonably be expected to yield judicial relief. But they could build more political support for
greater state control of federal resources. That support could
influence legislation and agency administration of public lands.
297. SELECT COMM. ON PUB. LANDS, supra note 288, at 8,
TO THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION COLLECTION, supra note 288.

14; see also A GUIDE

298. Wise Move? (PBS Online Newshour broadcast Feb. 19, 1996), (transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/wise_use_2-19.html)
(last visited Dec. 17, 2009).
299. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-901 to -909 (Supp. 1981–1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19-5-1 to -10 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 65-11-1 to -9 (Supp.
1981); see also CAWLEY, supra note 265, at 2.
300. CAWLEY, supra note 265, at 2.
301. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-12-109 (1980) (claiming ownership to all federal
lands within Wyoming except for land controlled by the United States Department of Defense, national parks, national monuments, wildlife refuges, wilderness
areas, and land held in trust for Indians).
302. 1980 Cal. Stat. 2607–09; 1980 Colo. Sess. Laws 857–58; 1980 Idaho Sess.
Laws 1003–04. The Hawaii Senate passed a similar resolution. Titus, supra note
260, at 264.
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Spoiling for such a fight, the Nevada State Board of Agriculture took the issue of western rangeland control back to
court with a direct attack on the constitutionality of FLPMA.303
The ambitious new State Attorney General, Richard H. Bryan,
used the cause as a stepping-stone to higher office.304 Bryan
made a second attempt at persuading the bench with the arguments the state had raised in the Kleppe litigation. Again
arguing for state control of western rangelands, Nevada asserted that “she and all of the public land states had an expectancy
upon admission into the Union that the unappropriated, unreserved and vacant lands within their borders would be disposed
of by patents to private individuals or by grants to the
States.”305 As in its Kleppe amicus brief, Nevada argued that
federal control of lands within western states’ borders prevented those states from standing on an equal footing with other
states, as required by the Constitution.306
This argument found no more success with the U.S. district court in Nevada than it did in the Supreme Court. Citing
Kleppe, Judge Reed reminded Nevada and every other western
state that the Property Clause “entrusts Congress with power
over the public land without limitations; it is not for the courts
to say how that trust shall be administered, but for Congress to
determine.”307 Judge Reed went on to explain that an otherwise
valid federal regulation does not violate the equal footing doctrine “merely because its impact may differ between various
states because of geographic or economic reasons.”308 The doctrine “does not cover economic matters,” the court reasoned, be303. Nev. ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166,
168 (D. Nev. 1981), aff’d, 699 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1983).
304. Bryan was elected Nevada governor following his term as attorney general and then enjoyed two full terms in the U.S. Senate. See Bryan, Richard H,
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–PRESENT,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000993 (last visited Oct.
4, 2011).
305. Nev. ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. at 170
(quoting Nevada’s brief) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Eugene R.
Gaetke, Refuting the “Classic” Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617, 621
n.23 (1985) (describing as “a fundamental tenet of the Sagebrush Rebellion” the
argument that, on admission of the state, the federal government must transfer
federal lands to the state).
306. Nev. ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. at 170;
see also John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and
Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317, 319–29 (1980) (providing thorough exploration of equal footing argument)..
307. Nev. ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. at 172.
308. Id. at 171 (citing Island Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 363 F.2d
120 (9th Cir. 1966)).
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cause “there never has been equality among the states in that
sense.”309 The Ninth Circuit had no trouble affirming the decision,310 thus putting an end to western states’ legal attempts to
wrest control of the public rangelands from the federal government. The equal footing issue made a brief encore in Nevada’s subsequent litigation to stop the federal government from
developing a repository for nuclear wastes at Yucca Mountain.311 But, by the time Nevada ranchers challenged federal
ownership of rangelands under the equal footing doctrine in
the 1990s, the State sided with the United States in defending
continued federal control.312
IV. KLEPPE’S ROLE AS A POLITICAL TOOL
Despite losses in the courts, the Sagebrush Rebellion (continuing in its more recent guise as the “states’ rights” or “wise
use” movement) has proven resilient to changing politics and
the dramatic demographic shifts in western states. What accounts for the staying power of a movement resting on such a
weak legal foundation and based largely on an industry with
shrinking economic importance?
Many have regarded the Sagebrush Rebellion as a bizarre
and misguided movement.313 As one author asked, “[w]hy
would the commodity interests—ranchers, loggers, et al.—want
to own federal lands that already offered such a bounty of subsidies?”314 The reality is that ranchers did not really want to
own the federal lands. Instead, ranchers and their representatives sought to stifle the effects of the 1970s federal legislation
increasing environmental restrictions on and competition for
the use of the public lands. Laws like the WFRHBA pitted
ranchers against the federal government by giving horses what
amounted to unrestricted access to scarce rangeland water and
309. Id. (citing United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950)).
310. Nev. ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 699 F.2d 486 (9th
Cir. 1983).
311. See Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1553 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
Property Clause challenge to statute authorizing waste facility); Nuclear Energy
Inst., Inc., v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1304–305 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(rejecting both Property Clause and equal footing challenges).
312. United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1317 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997); see also
United States v. Nye Cnty., 920 F. Supp. 1108, 1120 (D. Nev. 1996).
313. See Babbitt, supra note 260, at 853.
314. Donald Snow, The Pristine Silence of Leaving It All Alone, in A WOLF IN
THE GARDEN, supra note 51, at 28 (citing, for example, “absurdly cheap grazing
fees”).
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forage upon which the ranchers depended. The FLPMA exacerbated the tensions, even though it left the status quo of the
Taylor Grazing Act mostly intact and provided special solicitude for state interests and plans.315
The FLPMA required the BLM, for the first time, not only
to coordinate with and “assure that consideration is given to”
relevant state-authorized plans, but also to “provide for meaningful public involvement of State and local government officials.”316 This is a version of cooperative federalism that is
characterized by “state favoritism in federal process.”317 The
FLPMA encourages federal agencies to account for state concerns, but often requires little more than that the BLM “pay attention.”318 Ultimately, the agency may adopt its own ideas
about what is best for federal land management.319 The BLM’s
regulations, though, go further than FLPMA mandates in
structuring cooperative federalism.320 The regulations actually
require every BLM plan to be consistent with state and local
plans “so long as” the non-federal plans themselves are “consistent with the purposes, policies and programs of Federal
laws and regulations.”321 This standard invites state and local
planning to circumscribe BLM discretion in applying land use
statutes and rules. The BLM regulations also establish a “consistency review” procedure for determining when the BLM will
accept the recommendations of a governor on a plan.322 The
315. See Fischman & King, supra note 180.
316. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (2006). John Leshy cites this provision in stating
that “it can be argued that the FLPMA gives state and local governments a much
greater say in federal land management than previously.” Leshy, supra note 243,
at 348.
317. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, supra
note 267, at 200 (describing this type of cooperative federalism in natural resources law which provides special avenues for states, available to no other stakeholders (other than tribes), to influence federal decision-making).
318. N.M. ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1102,
1120–21, (D.N.M. 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 565 F.3d 683
(10th Cir. 2009) (upholding BLM’s oil and gas development plan for New Mexico’s
Otero Mesa notwithstanding the objections of the governor and inconsistencies
with certain state plans); see also Fischman & King, supra note 180, at 162–63
(discussing Otero Mesa dispute in the context of cooperative federalism).
319. N.M. ex rel. Richardson, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 1120–21.
320. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1610.3-1 to -.3-2 (2010); see Fischman & King, supra note
180, at 159–60.
321. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-2(a).
322. The consistency procedure requires the BLM state director to submit each
proposed BLM plan to the relevant governor for identification of any known inconsistencies. The governor then has 60 days to identify inconsistencies and provide recommendations for remedying the BLM plan. If the BLM state director
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BLM approach to its statute is more accommodating of state
interests than any other example of state favoritism in federal
process.323
A. “Un-cooperative Federalism” as a Legacy of the
Sagebrush Rebellion
The importance of cooperative federalism in the FLPMA
starkly contrasts the Sagebrush Rebellion’s distinctive “uncooperative” methods, which also characterize some contemporary assertions of local control over federal lands, especially in
Utah. In this respect, the Sagebrush Rebellion extends the
spectrum of “un-cooperative federalism” as conceptualized by
Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken.324 The most extreme opposition to federal objectives in their model is “civil
disobedience,” as exemplified by state resolutions opposing federal policies or declaring that a state will not enforce or participate in a federal scheme.325 The Sagebrush Rebellion demonstrates rebellious actions that lie beyond the uncooperative
endpoint of their continuum, such as state challenges to federal
legislation (e.g., WFRHBA and FLPMA) and direct interference
with agency management (as exemplified by the Kane County
roads dispute, described below).326
While most states put substantial energy into shaping public land policy through the channels created by Congress, the
rebellion (and its modern “wise use” adherents) rejected the
role of states as junior partners in resource management. The
choice to engage in “un-cooperative federalism” did not prevent
the very same states from quietly pursuing their interests
through existing statutory avenues to influence public land
management. Thus, after Nevada enacted its Sagebrush Rebellion bill,327 “state officials hurried to Washington to make sure
that their claim of ownership would not result in interruption

does not accept the governor’s recommendation(s), then the governor may appeal
to the national BLM director. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-2(e) (2010).
323. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, supra
note 267, at 200.
324. See generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 18.
325. Id. at 1271, 1278–80.
326. See infra notes 332–43 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 289–95 and accompanying text (discussing Assembly Bill
413).
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of federal payments to the state which were based on continuing federal land ownership.”328
The Sagebrush Rebellion was an effort of a frustrated minority, accustomed to power, that had been beaten back not
just by the power of the Property Clause but also by the environmental movement’s legislative success. Protests under the
Sagebrush Rebellion, and the related “wise use” banner, continue to directly challenge federal authority.329 Rather than “a
last gasp of a passing era,”330 the Sagebrush Rebellion signaled
the continued vitality of “un-cooperative federalism” as a tool
for political leverage.
For instance, Kane County, Utah engages in an ongoing
battle with the federal government over road claims on public
lands in southern Utah. Kane County stands with a new “Sagebrush Coalition” in opposing federal efforts to close roads or
limit motor vehicle access on federal lands.331 Like the Kleppe
challenge to the WFRHBA, the county was spurred into action
by what it perceived as federal overreaching into the domain of
traditional local control. On September 18, 1996, President
Clinton designated 1.9 million acres in southern Utah, including part of Kane County, as the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.332 Almost immediately thereafter, Kane
County commissioners approved the grading of what the county called “roads” in federal wilderness study areas and in the
national monument.333 The BLM called them “primitive
trails.”334 Crews employed by the county graded sixteen of the-

328. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 24, at 77.
329. See sources cited supra note 29.
330. Leshy, supra note 243, at 349; see also Clayton, supra note 265, at 533
(asserting that “[r]ather than fight for ownership of the public lands, a battle they
will surely lose, the Rebels should concentrate their efforts on attempting to
achieve increased control over the public land management decision process,” and
concluding that the Rebellion would result in “cooperative federalism seldom paralleled in the nation’s history”).
331. See Jackson, supra note 29.
332. Establishment of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 61
Fed. Reg. 50,223 (Sept. 18, 1996). Utah reacted with animosity. See, e.g., James
Brooke, New Reserve Stirs Animosities in Utah, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 13, 1996,
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/13/us/new-reserve-stirs-animosities-inutah.html?scp=1&sq=grand+staircase-escalante&st=nyt.
333. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 742
(10th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter SUWA]; see also Larry Warren, Utah Counties Bulldoze the BLM, Park Service, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS Oct. 28, 1996,
http://www.hcn.org/issues/92/2868/print_view.
334. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 742. The county claimed title to over 60 roads on federal lands, and “at least 30 roads within or on the boundary of Grand Staircase-
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se “roads” without getting approval from the BLM or even notifying the agency.335 Kane County defiantly claimed ownership
of the rights-of-way under an 1866 statute commonly called RS
2477.336 But even if the county possessed the rights under RS
2477, it would need BLM’s permission to conduct improvements on federal lands that go beyond mere maintenance of the
paths’ historical use.337 Prompted by the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, the BLM sought an injunction against the
county,338 which commenced a protracted and multifaceted battle that remains mired in the courts.
In August 2005, Kane County upped the ante by enacting
an ordinance opening some primitive trails on federal lands,
including the national monument, to off-road vehicle (ORV)
use, contravening BLM policy.339 The BLM then attempted to
close those same areas to such uses, but the county later took
down the BLM signs and placed its own signs indicating the
routes were “open.”340 Challenged in court by environmental
groups, the county initially lost on the merits only to succeed in
getting the case dismissed for lack of standing.341 Representing
Kane County in the dispute over roads in Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument was none other than Mike Lee,
the Utah eminent domain bill supporter who rode to the Senate
on the latest iteration of the “un-cooperative federalism”

Escalante National Monument.” Eryn Gable, Court Rules Enviros Can’t Challenge
Utah County’s Road Claims, LAND LETTER, Jan. 13, 2011.
335. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 742; Gable, supra note 334.
336. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §
932), repealed by Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94579 § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §1701 (2006)). While
new RS 2477 rights could not be created after 1976, “valid” RS 2477 rights existing at the date of repeal continue in effect. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 741. FLPMA provided no procedure to validate or record existing RS 2477 rights. Id.
337. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 745.
338. Id. at 743.
339. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 470 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1303 (D. Utah
2006). The court granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint in order to
add the BLM and the Fish and Wildlife Service as defendants for a claim under
the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 1308–09. The District Court again addressed
the merits of the case in 2008. See The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 560 F.
Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Utah 2008) (holding that county ordinance allowing ORV use
on federal land was preempted by federal law), aff’d, 581 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir.
2009), rev’d on other grounds, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding environmental groups lacked standing to challenge county claims to RS 2477 rights on
federal public land).
340. The Wilderness Soc’y, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1154–56.
341. The Wilderness Soc’y, 632 F.3d at 1165.
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movement: the Tea Party.342 Despite its tenuous legal foundation, the county’s strategy of “un-cooperative federalism” has
reaped some practical dividends. In 2010, the Obama administration stipulated that five of the Kane County claims had
perfected rights under RS 2477, including Skutumpah Road,
which cuts through Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.343 In 2011, Utah began dipping into its appropriations
under the 2010 eminent domain law to assert ownership of
rights-of-way in the neighboring Garfield County portion of
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.
B.

Social Science Perspective on Kleppe’s Role in the
Sagebrush Rebellion

Social scientists who have studied political movements’ use
of confrontational litigation offer lessons applicable to the
Kleppe story. One lesson is that the “Sagebrush Rebellion” may
be a better term than “states’ rights” because it reflects the
kind of coalition-building necessary to achieve success in the
executive and legislative branches when judicially enforceable
rights are not available.344 While United States culture may
conceive of political ideals in terms of fights for rights in courts,
failure in the judicial forum does not foreclose success in other
arenas.345 In the end, “states’ rights” in federal natural resources law may be more important as a political rallying cry
than a judicial doctrine.346

342. Gable, supra note 334; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing Mike Lee’s role in promoting Utah’s 2010 eminent domain law).
343. The victory is a limited one, however, as the federal government likely retains the power to make reasonable regulations respecting rights-of-way on public
land. See Hale v. Norton, 461 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (reaffirming principle that rights-of-way through federal lands are subject to reasonable regulation
by the United States); The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 581 F.3d 1198, 1229
n.4 (10th Cir. 2009) (McConnell, J., dissenting) (conceding that even if the county
established valid RS 2477 claims, the federal government retained “substantial
regulatory authority” over the rights-of-way). At least one other right-of-way, Bald
Knoll Road, was previously acknowledged by the BLM. Christine Hoekenga, The
Road More Traveled, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2007; Rachel Jackson, Counties Cross the Yellow Line, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, July 20, 2001.
344. EPP, supra note 14, at 13 (emphasis added).
345. Id. at 15–16.
346. Another vehicle for states’ rights constitutional claims is the Tenth
Amendment, although this route is unlikely to see much more success than the
states’ previous arguments. See, e.g., Shepard, supra note 23, at 528–32 (exploring
Tenth Amendment claims cases after Kleppe which raised the Tenth Amendment
as an issue, and the likelihood of this argument’s success in the future).
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Another lesson emerges from Eve S. Weinbaum’s study of
community-based activism in Tennessee to fight plant closings,
de-industrialization, and economic inequality. She tells a similar “story of failure” in a very different context from Kleppe.347
The central characters in her story had far less access to power
in state government than the ranchers in the Sagebrush Rebellion. Nonetheless, Weinbaum’s research illustrates how disparate but “organized, aggressive, confrontational” social movements348 can build institutions, “activist networks, and longterm coalitions” in losing battles, which “created the conditions
for later success.”349
Failures—rather than resulting in humiliation and depression—can create the context for social change and pivotal
political movements. Successful failures do not always
transform the economy, or the social or political landscape,
but they can accomplish crucial outcomes.350

The story of Kleppe fits Weinbaum’s category of a “successful failure.”351 The Sagebrush Rebellion would repeat, often intentionally, quixotic lawsuits. Indeed, the legislative history of
Nevada’s Assembly Bill 413 explicitly recognized the usefulness
of doomed litigation to the larger cause of reducing federal
limitations on public land users.352 Utah’s 2010 law353 illustrates the continuing popularity of this approach.
The converse to Weinbaum’s term—one might call it a
“failed success”—is also evident in the struggle over public
rangeland management. An important limitation of activism
through courts is that winning a case does not necessarily ensure compliance.354 An example of this is the litigation that Oliver Houck highlights as the pivotal case paving the way for
enactment of the FLPMA.355 The environmentalist victory in
NRDC v. Morton did require the BLM to conduct comprehen347. WEINBAUM, supra note 14, at 7.
348. Id. at 10.
349. Id. at 8.
350. Id. at 267.
351. Of course, sometimes litigation losses lead to more failure. Benjamin I.
Sachs has shown how this is true in labor organizing, where collective action depends on workers’ self-reinforcing dynamic of success. Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2690 (2008).
352. See supra notes 283–87 and accompanying text.
353. H.B. 143, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess., 2010 Utah Laws (codified at UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010)).
354. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 13, at 117–18.
355. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land, supra note 22, at 2305–07.
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sive environmental impact analyses to evaluate the relationship between range conditions and grazing.356 But it did not
ensure full compliance. Environmental impact analysis
continues to lag far behind public rangeland decision-making,
and has not made much of a dent in allotment stocking decisions.357
Unsurprisingly, the legal literature concentrates more on
the outcomes of litigation than social science research,358 which
views success or failure through a wider lens. The late Stuart
Scheingold pioneered the use of political science to better understand the practical, on-the-ground changes wrought by disputes over rights. Scheingold’s analytical framework “decenter[s]” law to shift its focus from authoritative institutions,
such as courts, to “the more fluid terrain” of intermediate institutions, such as agencies and civil society organizations.359 The
“decenter[ed]” view we present of Kleppe reveals substantial
success in intermediate institutions, such as the BLM, which
has largely insulated ranchers from their worst fears and environmentalists’ best hopes of public land law reform.
Scheingold’s conclusions about the politics of rights nicely
summarize the meaning of Kleppe, the rise of the Sagebrush
Rebellion, and public rangeland reform. Judicial acceptance of
rights or other legal arguments does not
mean that the goal will be embraced more generally nor
that the social changes implied will be effected. If there is
opposition elsewhere in the system, the judicial decision is
more likely to engender than to resolve political conflict. In
that conflict, a right is best treated as a resource of uncer356. NRDC v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 841 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d, 527 F.2d
1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Houck,The Water, the Trees, and the Land, supra
note 22, at 2300–08 (discussing NRDC v. Morton).
357. See, e.g., Idaho Watersheds Project v. Hahn, 307 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2002);
W. Watersheds Project v. Bennett, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Idaho 2005) (discussing BLM failure to conduct NEPA analysis on grazing permits and other problems
with FLPMA administration). For the past decade Congress has responded to the
BLM’s failure to keep up with NEPA compliance on grazing permit renewals by
providing relief in the form of riders on the annual Interior Appropriations budget. The riders direct that expiring grazing permits be renewed under the same
terms until the Secretary can complete the NEPA analysis. See, e.g., Act of Nov.
10, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–108, § 325, 117 Stat. 1307, 1307–08 (2003). The Forest
Service faces the same kind of problem with a backlog of environmental impact
analyses for its grazing permits. Eryn Gable, Thousands of Forest Service Allotments Await NEPA Analyses, LAND LETTER, Aug. 2, 2007.
358. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 23. (discussing legal scholarship on
Kleppe).
359. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 13, at xxii.

2011]

STORY OF KLEPPE V. NEW MEXICO

153

tain worth, but essentially like other political resources:
money, numbers, status, and so forth.360

Similarly, New Mexico’s failure in Kleppe did not doom
state resistance to federal public land reform or dampen ranchers’ objections to incorporating environmental values in natural
resource allocation. Instead, it helped spark the Sagebrush Rebellion and a host of spin-off movements that succeeded with
money, status in agency deliberations, and political allies as often as they failed in courts.
Perhaps even more relevant for understanding the role of
Kleppe in the Sagebrush Rebellion is the recent work of Michael Klarman on the civil rights movement.361 His analysis of
Brown v. Board of Education362 cautions that even the highest
profile Supreme Court decisions themselves do not (necessarily) directly prompt change. He argues that it was the southern
backlash in response to Brown, rather than the holding itself,
that catalyzed real reform in practice, especially in the form of
the federal civil rights laws of the 1960s.363
Notwithstanding that Kleppe has no place in the pantheon
of the most important decisions of the Court, Professor Klarman’s work offers two lessons for our story. First, commentators should resist the urge to exaggerate the extent to which a
judicial opinion directly alters the social-legal framework for
allocating influence and power.364 For example, Brown itself
arguably failed directly to end legal segregation in the deep
South.365 Certainly, Kleppe failed to stanch western state “uncooperation” with federal land management objectives. As lawyers ourselves, we perhaps exaggerate the direct role of Kleppe
in our enthusiasm to connect legislation, litigation, administration, and politics.366 Second, court decisions may be most im360. Id. at 7; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (documenting legally adjudicated rights
playing only a marginal role in resolving on-the-ground conflicts in the context of
social norms of liability among ranchers in northern California).
361. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); Michael J. Klarman,
How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81
(1994), available at JSTOR.
362. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
363. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 361; Klarman,
How Brown Changed Race Relations, supra note 361, at 82.
364. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations, supra note 361, at 81.
365. Id. at 84–85.
366. In this respect, we follow a long line of legal commentators chided by
Klarman. See id. at 81 n.1. Professor Rosenberg develops a more finely detailed
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portant for their indirect impacts on political discourse through
backlash.367 Klarman argues that it was the violent, massive
resistance to Brown that had the greatest impact on politics
and stands as its lasting legacy.368 He summarizes this argument in stating that “the post-Brown racial backlash created a
political environment in which southern elected officials stood
to benefit at the polls by boldly defying federal authority.”369
While the backlash in the West cannot be compared to the
South’s mass resistance to Brown v. Board of Education, “uncooperative federalism” certainly pays dividends at the polls.
Just ask Utah’s Senator Mike Lee.
CONCLUSION
With its legal arguments shredded, one might imagine the
Sagebrush Rebellion died a simple death. But it lived on, fueled
by the very litigation losses that seem to mark its failure.
Kleppe was the first great court battle of the rebellion. In many
ways, it served as the template for subsequent legal tactics that
helped build political support for the ranching interests and
other private property concerns reflected in western state ideology.
It would be hard to imagine how the basic narrative of the
WFRHBA’s enactment and the Kleppe decision could be worse
for ranchers. They completely failed to shape the legislation in
Congress and lost badly in the Supreme Court. More broadly,
the Sagebrush Rebellion, which the WFRHBA and Kleppe
helped spur, enjoyed no major judicial victories. Yet, as Utah
prepares to spend millions more on futile litigation,370 the
Sagebrush Rebellion continues to enjoy success in setting the
terms of political debate, and electing officials who will advance
the rhetoric of state control. By framing the issues as ones of
states’ rights and local culture, the sagebrush rebels offered an
alternative narrative to downplay ecological concerns of overgrazing. Congress inadvertently paved the way with the
model to determine when litigation succeeds in changing the political balance of
power in policy disputes. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1st ed. 1991).
367. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations, supra note 361, at 82.
368. Id. Massive resistance was the “unification of southern racial intransigence, which . . . propelled politics in virtually every southern state . . . .” Id. Massive resistance included the brutal suppression of civil rights demonstrations. Id.
369. Id. at 110.
370. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
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WFRHBA, which did not rest on ecological grounds and distracted reformers from the problems of livestock overgrazing.
The sagebrush rebels may have peddled legal theories based on
a “mendacious myth” about the Constitution and federal power.371 But myths exert great power over the way people understand the world and its conflicts. So despite all the failures, the
rebellion and its modern progeny successfully resisted major
reforms of grazing management aimed at restoring the ecological condition of the public range.
The story of Kleppe and its aftermath shows how legislative frustration and court losses sustain popular movements. In
this respect, the sagebrush rebels and their kin in the wise use,
states’ rights, Tea Party, and property rights movements share
important characteristics with the traditionally liberal causes
of civil rights and economic justice. At the dawn of the modern
era of public land law, the perennial complaints of public land
states moved into courtrooms, mimicking the tactics of the very
environmentalists they abhorred. Both interests gained political leverage as a result.

371. Scott W. Reed, The County Supremacy Movement: Mendacious Myth Marketing, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 525 (1993).

